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Our paper seeks to provide an explanation for why theprevalence of
COLA provisions and their characteristicsvary widely across U.S. indus-
tries. We develop models of optimal risk sharing betweena firm and
union that allows us to investigate the determinants ofa number of charac-
teristics of onion contracts. These include thepresence of wage indexa—
tion, the degree of wage indexation if it exists, the magnitude of deferred
noncontingent (on the price level) wage increases, the duration of labor
contracts and the trade—off between temporary layoffs andwage indexatlon.
Preliminary empirical tests of some of the implications of the modelare
conducted using industry data on both the prevalence of COLAprovisions and
layoff rates, and using contract level data on the characteristics of COLA
provisions and contract duration. One key finding is that the level of
unemployment insurance benefits appears to simultaneously influence the
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Cost—of—living escalator clauses in union contracts tie, or index,
workers' wages to some index of prices, such as the Consumer PriceIndex.
The first major U.S. labor contract to contain sucha provision was the
1948 contract between General Motors and the United Automobile Workers.'
The prevalence of such provisions spread duringthe-inflatjon thataccom-
panied the Korean War, but interest in them waned as theeconomy experi-
enced stable prices during the early 1950s. As a result,by January 1955,
only 23 percent of those workers covered by major collective bargaining
agreements, agreements that covered 1,000 or more workers, were also
covered by contracts that included cost—of—living provisions (Table1).
When prices rose during the late 1950scoverage expanded, as large national
Contracts in steel, aluminum and can, railroads, and electricalequipment
incorporated such provisions. The relative price stability of the early
1960s led to a reduction in coverage; indeed thecost—of—living provision
was dropped from the steel contract in 1962. Since 1966, however, high
rates of InflatIon have been associated with steady increases incoverage
and during the 1976—1981 period roughly 60percent of workers covered by
major union contracts were also covered by cost—of—living provisions
(Table 1).
The growth in the prevalence of cost—of—living provisions (COLA's),
has led to a rekindling of both academic and public interest in thetopic
2 and this interest has taken a number of forms.First, attention has
been directed towards the role of COLA's In the inflationaryprocess.
During the l97Os the wages of employees in heavily unionized industries
who were covered by COLA's grew significantly relative to thewages of2
other employees in theeconomy.3 In addition, the growing prevalenceof
multi—year contracts with COLAprovisions has been shown toreduce the
responsiveness of the aggregaterate of wage inflation tothe aggregate
unemployment rate; increases inthe rate of unemployment now"buy" less
of a reduction in wage inflation
than they did in the1960s.4 Because
of these facts COLA's are thought bysome to be •one pf the causesof the
persistent high rates ofinflation we have experiencedin the United
States; this even thoughCOLA's typically provide workers
with much less
than 100 percent protection againstinflation.5
Second, attention has beendirected to the role that COLA's mayplay
in reducing the level of strikeactivity in the economy. Onereason that
a collective bargaining
negotiation may not be settled priorto a strike
is that an employer and aunion's forecasts and perceptionsabout future
rates of inflation maysubstantially differ. The presencein a contract
of a COLA provision, which ties
the wage over the course of acontract to
future prices, reduces theneed for the employer and theunion's price
forecasts to coincide arid thus mayreduce the likelihood of astrike
occurring.6 Since strike activity involves lost output,
the presence of
COLA's may well have a positiveeffect on aggregate output.
Third, numerous economists havefocused on the implicationsof COLA'S
for macroeconomic stabilization
policy.7 Among the questionS they ask
are "Can indexing schemes protectthe aggregate economy fromreal and/or
monetary shocks?", "Howdoes the degree of indexinginfluence government
stabilization policy?", and"What is the optimal degree ofindexation, from
the perspective of
macro_stabilization or aggregate efficiencypolicy?".
Their objective is to show thatin a world of uncertain futureoutcomes,3
where the establishment of contingent contracts thatcover every possible
state of th world is impossible, thepresence of COLA's does lead to
welfare gains.
Finally, another stream of research has focused on the implications
of COLA's for microeconomic efficiency, inparticular the sharing of risks
of uncertain outcomes by firms and workers. Thesepapers are in the tra—
dition of the "implicit contract" literature andthey focus on the optimal
degree of indexation from the perspective of a micro—level decisionmaking
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unit. In particular, they examine the effects of such variablesas the
expected rate of inflation, uncertainty, employee risk aversion, thecost
of indexing and nonlabor income on the optimaldegree of indexing.
Somewhat surprisingly, although the latter two streams of literature
have focused on the determination of the optimaldegree of indexation at
the aggregate and micro levels, there have beenonly a few attempts to see
if these theories can be used to explain either thevarying prevalence of
COLA's in the aggregate U.S. economy over timeor why the prevalence of
COLA's and their characteristics varies across industriesat a point in
time.9 Table 2presents data for November of 1980 that indicate quite
clearly that the prevalence of COLA's in major collective bargainingagree-
ments varies widely across industries. Moreover, one can not attribute
these differences solely to differences in unionstrength; for example, a
strong national union exists in bituminous coal mining and strong local
unions exist in construction, but in neither industry are theremany
contracts with COLA's.
Our paper seeks to provide an explanation for why theprevalence of
COLAprovisionsand their characteristics vary widely across U.S. industries.4
Wedo this in the context of modelsof opt imal risk sharing bLtwcna
firmanda union that allow us toinvestigate the determinants of a
number of characteristics of unioncontracts. In addition to focusing
on the degree of wage indexatiOfl,
we focus on the determinantsof deferred
nominal or real wage increases in
multiperiod contracts that are not con-
tingent on the realized pricelevel, on the determinants ofthe duration
of labor contracts, and, to integrateour research more fully intothe
implicit contract literature, onthe influence of parameters ofthe unem-
ployment insurance (UI) system onthe extent of indexation andthe level
of temporary layoffs.
We begin in the next sectionwith a simple one—period model inwhich
employment is predetermined
and indexatiOn is assumed to existand ascer-
tain the factors that determinethe extent of indexatiOn. SectionIII
relaxes the assumption that indexed
contracts exist and focuses onthe
forces that influence the probabilityof observing indexed contracts.
In Section IV we move to a two—periodmodel with indexation and predeter-
mined employment and analyze howthe extent of indexation variesacross
periods what factors determine,the size. of deferred wage increasesand
how such increases vary with theextent of indexatiOfl. SectionV addresses
the issue of the choice of contractduration. The final theoretical
section, Section VI, returns to aone—period model with indexation,but
allows employment to be variable across
states_of_the—world. This section
provides an explanation ofthe forces that simultaneouslyinfluence both
the extent of indexation and thelevel of temporary layoffs, highlighting
the role of parameters of the UI system.
The major message of the
theoretical sections is that evenin rather
simple models, there are a largenumber of variables that influencethese5
contract provisions. The following two sections attempt to test sonic of
the hypothuses that these models generated. Section VII uses pooled cross—
section time—series data at the two—digit manufacturing industry level
to ascertain the determinants of both the proportion of unionized workers
who are covered by COLA's and industry layoff rates. Section VIII uses
individual contract data to ascertain the determinants of COLA coverage,
the characteristics of COLA's when they exist, and the determinants of
the duration of contracts. Finally, Section IX summarizes what we have
learned from the paper and provides some concluding remarks.
II. A ONE-PERIOD MODEL WITH FIXED EMPLOYMENT
Consider first the following simple one—period model. A union and
an employer must decide on the provisions of a collective bargaining agree—
nient before the aggregate price level is known. At the time negotiations
take place, the aggregate price level p. is equal to unity, but during
the period that the contract will cover the price level is uncertain; the
expected value of p during the period is denoted by and its coef-
ficient of variation by >0.We also treat the firm's production function,
its demand curve, and the prices of its nonlabor inputs as being uncertain,
in a manner to be specified below.
In principle, an optimal risk sharing arrangement would make both the
wage and the employment level contingent on the realized outcomes of the
aggregate price level, the firm's productivity, its demand curve (as
proxied perhaps by its output price level), and the price of its nonlabor
inputs. For now, however, we assume that the employment level is pre-
determined and equal to the number of union members, N. Thus, there is6
no temporary layoff unemployment in this model;in Section VI we relax this
assumption and allow the employment level to vary across statesof the world.
In addition, we assume that when the employer and theunion negotiate
a wage schedule w, this wage is contingent upon, orindexed only to the
aggregate price level
(1) w =w(p).
Virtually all contracts with COLA's in the United States arestructured
in this manner and only rarely are wages explicitlytied to future produc-
tivity, industry price levels, or input pricelevels.10 Our failure to
observe more contracts which also tie wages to thesevariables, undoubtedly
reflects factors such as moral hazard (firms may have somecontrol over
their output prices) and the costs of obtaining informationand enforcing
such contracts (the difficulties involved in measuring productivityand
demand shifts, etc.))' Later, however, we will indicatehow allowing
contracts to be contingent on these variableswould alter the results.
Suppose that workers are risk averse andhave cardinal utility functions
of the form
(2) U =U[(w/p)+ M] U' >0 U" <0.
Utility depends on the worker's real income in a period,with M being
the level of real nonwage labor income. For now we treatM as being
identically equal to zero; later we will indicatehow the extent that it
varies with the price level effects the optimal degreeof indexation of7
wages. Note that when M is equal to zero, for a given wage schedule,
a worker's expected utility (E U(w/p)) depends only on the distribution
of the price level during the period.
The firm uses labor (L) and a composite variable input (X) to
produce output (Q) via the production function relationship
(3) Q =f(L,X,e1).
Here e1 is a random productivity shock whose realized value becomes
known only after the contract is signed. That is, productivity is uncer-
tain at the time of the negotiations. For simplicity, we assume that e1
is independent of both the distribution and realization of the aggregate
price level.
Demand for the firm's output is assumed to depend both on the price
charged by the firm and on the amount of unanticipated inflation, with the
latter defined by
The notion is that unanticipated inflation in the aggregate price level may
lead to increases In the demand for some firms' products and decreases in
the demand for others.'2
Specifically, we assume that the inverse demand function can be
written
(5) q =pg(Q,,e2)8
where q is the price of the firm's product, e2 is a randomdemand
shock whose realization becomes known only after negotiations areconcluded
and the inclusion of Q allows the firm to face a downward sloping
demand curve. The demand shock is assumed to be independentof the distri-
bution of the aggregate price level and accordingly we assumethat the real
price of its product (q/p) that the firm can chargefor any specified
output level is independent of the expectedinflation rate.
The price of the variable input X is also assumed to depend onthe
amount of unanticipated inflation and is given by
(6) z =
wherez is the price of the input and e3 is arandom cost shock. As
with the other shocks, the realized value of e3 becomesknown only after
the negotiations are completed and e3 is assumed to be independentof
the distribution of the aggregate price level (although itneed not be
independent of e1 and e2). The firm is assumed,in (6), to be a price
taker in the market for the other input for expositionalconvenience only.
Since initially employment (L) is always equal tothe number of




The variable input X is chosen after the realizedvalues of all of the
random variables are known and, conditional upon them, Xis always chosen
by the firm to maximize profits. Assuming an interiorsolution always
exists, this requires that9
(8) =0 y p and e where a =(e1,e2,e3).




where V is a cardinal utility function, V >0,and V'1 <0(=0)if
the firm is risk averse (risk neutral). Given a wage schedule w(p), the
firm's expected utility obviously depends upon the distributions of all of
the random variables in the model.
The goal of the union is to maximize the representative worker's
expected utility, while the goal of the firm is to maximize its expected
utility. It is beyond the scope of this paper to model the bargaining
process and show how it may lead to an agreed uponcontract.13 The only
assumption that we make here is that the parties will reach a contract
that provides for efficient sharing of all risks stemming from unanticipated
inflation. Such contracts can be obtained by choosing a wage indexation
schedule that maximizes
(10) =E[U(w/p)]+ X E [V(i/p)]
p,e
where A is a parameter that indicates the "share of the pie" that the
employer receives. Other things equal, higher values of A reflect
greater employer bargaining power.10
It is useful to define thefollowingfunctions:
dwR
(11) theelasticityof the wage rate, ,w.r.t.the
p aggregate price level, p,
a E-
the elasticity of the firm's demand curve, g,
g w.r.t. unanticipated inflation, ,
-b h
the elasticity of other input prices, h, w.r.t.
p unanticipated inflation, ,
E_-
the (absolute value) of the elasticity of demand
g w.r.t. the firm's real price, q/p,
E1—nithe elasticity of total revenue w.r.t. the firm's
output, Q,
theelasticity of output w.r.t. the other input, X,
A the elasticity of the firm's real value—added w.r. t.
theaggregate price level, p,
-U"w
and S =——-theworkers relative risk aversion. Up
In general each of these variables is a function and not a parameter.
In what follows when we talk about a change in any one of them we mean a
shift in the whole schedule.
The elasticity of the wage rate witli respect to the aggregate price
level, c, is a measure of the extent to which the wage rateis indexed
to the price level. It is straightforward to show (see AppendixA) that
maximization of (10) subject to (1) —(9)yields that the optimal degree






That is, the optimal degree of wage indexation depends on bothfactors-
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exogenousto the bargaining process (such as theextentof employer and
employee risk aversion) and on the outcome of the bargaining process
itself (such as the level of wages).
Note that if the firm is risk neutral(V't =0)indexation is com-
plete (c =1).In this case, the real wage is independent of the aggre—
gate price level and the firm fully insulates workers against inflation
risks. Since collective bargaining agreements seldom call for
complete indexation, throughout the rest of the paper we assume that the
firm is risk ,averse.
It is apparent from (12) that the elasticity of the firm's real value
added with respect to the aggregate price level, A, is a key variable in
determining the extent of indexation. If A is greater (less) than zero,
so that increases in the aggregate price level increase'(decrease) the
firm's real value added, then the firm shares the rewards (costs) of infla-
tion by providing workers with a more than (less than) complete indexation.
That is,
(13) c1 as AO
That is, indexation is not necessarily less than full; optimal risk—sharing
agreements may call for workers to be "overcompensated" for inflation. Of
course, if inflation is neutral In the sense that the firm's demand and
the price of nonlabor inputs are unaffected by unanticipated inflation
(a =b=0for all e), then e =1.In this special case inflation
risk affects the firm only through its effect on real wages, and full
indexation elimintes all inflation risk for both workers and firm. The12
firm is stil.l exposed to other risks (e), but since these are not
related to inflation they cannot be alleviated by indexation tothe
aggregate pricelevel)4
The first column in Table 3 summarizes the main comparativestatic
results that follow from equation (.12); how changes in variousfactors
influence the optimal degree of indexation. An increase inthe elasticity
of the demand curve with respect to unanticipated inflation (a)increases
the degree of indexation since the larger the increase inreal value—added
that results from an unanticipated increase in prices, the largerthe "pie"
that is available to share with workers. Conversely, the largerthe
elasticity of other input prices with respect to unanticipatedinflation
(b), the more disadvantageous is the unanticipatedinflation to the firm
and therefore the smaller the degree of wage indexation that occurs.
The effect of the elasticity of the firm's demand curvewith respect
to its real price ii,depends upon the relationship of a and b. To see
this, consider first the special case where these twoelasticities are
equal (a =b).ifl this case, unanticipated inflation causes identical
percentage changes in the real marginal revenue productof nonlabor inputs
(MRP) and in the inputs' real price. Since the inputlevel, x, is always
chosen so that its real marginal revenue product equalsits real price
(eq. (8)), there will be no adjustment in the amountof the input used and
hence in output. In terms of Figure la the firm will movefrom M to N.
Consequently, the value of i-idoesnot affect the change in real value—
added in this case and c will be independent of n.
In contrast, if a is greater than b, a higherunanticipated infla-
tion implies a higher percentage increase in MRPthanin z. In order13
to maintain the equal ity between thevariableinput's marginal revenue
product andits pricetheamount of the inputand henceoutput must be
higher.The magnitude of this effect will be larger the higher the
elasticityof the marginal revenue product curve with respect to the input.
This is illustrated in Figure lb where we assume that a is greater than
b. The firm will move from M to 0 with a less elastic demand curve and
from M to P with a more elastic one. The latter case is associated with
a greater increase in real value—added and thus we should observe a higher
degree of indexation associated with it. Since,other things equal, higher
values of the elasticity of the firm's demand curve with respect to its
real price are associated with more elastic marginal revenue product curves
for the variable input, higher elasticities of the demand curve will lead
to higher values of wage indexation in this case.'5 In contrast, if a is
less than b, similar reasoning shows that increasing the elasticity of
the firm's demand curve with respect to its own price will reduce the
extent of indexation.
The key point here, then, is that the firm's elasticity of demand with
respect to its own real price (ri) does affect the optimal degree of wage index—
ation, but that the direction of the effect depends upon the relationship
of a and b, the elasticities of the firm's demand curve and its other
input prices with respect to unanticipated inflation. If a is greater
(less) than b, higher values of r lead to more (less) wage indexation.
Since a higher elasticity of output with respect to the variable input ()
isalso associated with a higher elasticity of the variable input's MRP
curve, analogous results follow with respect to this variable. That is,
increases in are associated with increases (decreases) in the extent
of indexation if a is greater (less) than b.14
Several other results are easier to explain. First, the more risk
averse woikers are, the greater is the value to them of smoothingvaria-
tions in the real wage. Consequently, increased risk aversion (S) is
associated with values of c closer to unity. Note that if the optimal
degree of indexation is initially less (greater) than unitybecause A is
less (greater) than zero, increasing the extent of employee risk aversion
will increase (decrease) the extent ofindexation.'6
Second, the optimal degree of indexation is independent of boththe
expected level of inflation (5) and the uncertainty ofinflation (s).
Theseresults follow directly from the assumption that all 'real variables
are unaffected by the distribution of p, as opposed toits realized
17
value.
Finally, the optimal degree of indexation also depends onthe residual
uncertainty in real value added; the uncertainty inreal value added caused
by shocks to productivity, demand, and other input prices.Unfortunately,
its effect on the optimal degree of indexation depends upon many parameters
in the model and how they change. If one further assumes, however,that
a, b, r, ,Aand R (where R =—(V"/V)(lT/p)is the firm's relative
risk aversion) are constant, it can be shown (see Appendix A)that
(14) '0 as A(S —R)-0
where the coefficient of variation of real value added is used as
a measure of the residual uncertainty in realvalue—added. If employee
relative risk aversion (S)is greater than employer relative risk
aversion, this implies that increased residual uncertaintymakes indexation
less perfect (further fromunity).1815
Beforeconci uding this section, twoextensionsof the mode.I warrdnt
being briefly discussed. First, suppose that we relax the assumption that
theemployee'snonlahor income, M, is always zero. Assuming that the
levelof nonlabor income is positive, its effect on the optimal degree
ofwage indexation dependsupon how it varies with the price level. If
the level of nonlabor income is fixed in nominal terms, then to stabilize
the sum of real wages and real nonlabor income will require a greater
degree of wage indexation than in the absence of the nonlabor income, assum-
ing that indexation is positive. In contrast, if the nonlabor income is fixed
in real terms (perfectly indexed), then any desired degree of real income stabi—
lization (not equal to perfect stabilization) can be achieved with now less
perfect wage indexation Cc further from unity).
Second, suppose we now allow wages to be indexed not only to the aggre-
gate price level, but also to the shocks to the firm's productivity, demand
curve, and input prices. In this case, one can show that
(15) =
[1













Observe that (15) suggests that if employers are risk neutral (R =0)
then wages are tied only to the aggregate price level (in this case recall
that c =1)and not to the other forces. If firms are risk averse, in16
theory wages should be tied to all of the other forces. However, small
values of the elasticity of the firm's total revenues with respect to
its output (),ofthe elasticity of its output with respect to other
inputs (s),andof the elasticities of output, demand, and input prices
with respect to the random shocks will reduce the extent to which wages
are tied to the other forces. These factors, in addition to the ones we
have described above, may explain why wages are typically not indexed to
anything other than the aggregate price level.
III. THE DECISION TO INDEX
As Table 1 indicates, in recent years approximately 60 percent of
all unionized workers covered by major collective bargaining agreements
are also covered by COLA provisions. It would be coincidental if the
optimal degree of wage irtdexation implied by (12) was zero for 40 percent
of unionized employees. What factors are responsible then for such a
large fraction of workers having contracts that are not indexed at all?
The answer hinges on the possibility that there may be fixed real
costs per worker of negotiating or administrating indexation clauses that
must be borne either by the union or the employer. These costs may arise
from a number of factors. For example, if a contract is indexed, union
leaders may not receive "credit" from their members for the periodic
nominal wage increases that automatically arise due to inflation. As a
result, to maintain their political positions in the union, union leaders
may push during contract negotiations for additional periodic noncontingent
money wage increases; this may make it more difficult to reach a contract
settlement.To take another example, in a world of heterogeneous workers of
differing skill levels, employers would like to have the flexibility to
alter relative wages in response to external shortages or surpluses of
workers in particular skill classes. COLA provisions, however,typically
are specified as a given percentage increase in wages for each percentage
increase in prices, or as a given absolute increase inwages for each
percentage point increase in prices. The former scheme rigidly preserves
relative wage rates, while the latter causes skill differentials to be
compressed. In either case, the employer loses the ability to alter rela-
tive wages during the period covered by the contract and this reduces his
willingness to agree to COLA provisions.
Suppose that we can represent these fixed real costs per worker of
having an indexed contract by c., then the total cost of indexation is
c1N. Indexation of course yields benefits to both the employer and the
employees in terms of risk sharing. The monetary value of these benefits
to them is the total amount in real terms that both parties would be
willing to pay to have wages indexed. Appendix B shows that this real
amount is approximately equal to
(16) 1 22(S —NEV"/EV'),
where =w()/, = ()/, cis evaluated at ,Sis evaluated at
and V' and V't are evaluated at 9Thus, the sum of the net benefits
per employee to both parties from having an indexed contract is
(17) B =2c2(S—NEV"/EV')—18
While in general one cannotobserve the continUOUSvariable B, one
can observe whether acontract contains a COLAand it is reasonable to
postulate in empiricalimplementations that
(18) B =1if B v>O
=o otherwise
Here B equals 1, if a
contract has a COLA and is zerootherwise, and
v is a randomvariable that summarizes allother unobservable forces
that may influence COLA coverage.
From (17) and (18) it is
straightforward to see how variousforces
influence the probabilitYof a COLA's existing and theseare summarized in
Table 3. First, note that a,b, riand influence B only through c,
thus their effect on the probability
of observing a COLA is the sameas their
effect on the degree ofindexatiOn, given that indexationoccurs and is posi-
tive. Second, one can showthat the more risk averseworkers are the greater
the gain from indexatiOn tothem and thus the more likelyone will observe an
indexedcontract.2° Third, while the expected rate of
inflation has no
effect on the probabilityof indexation, given that
workers are risk averse,
the more uncertain inflationis the greater is the gainto them of indexa—
tion and thus the greateris the likelihood ofindexation. Fourth, an
increase in the costsof having an indexed contract
obviously reduces the
probabilitY of havingsuch acontract.2Finally, if one additionally
assumes that a, b, r, 3,A, R and S are constantsand that the extent
of employer risk aversion justequals that of employeerisk aversion
(R =S),then an increase in residual
uncertaintY increases the proba-
bility of observingindexedcontracts.22'9
In the main then, the same variables that affect the degree of indcxa—
tion, if litoccurs,also influence the probability of indexation. However,
asTable 3 indicates, in several cases the effect of a variable on the
former may be different than its effect on the latter, and one variable,
the coefficient of variation of expected inflation, influences only the
latter.
IV. A TWO—PERIOD MODEL, DEFERRED PAYMENTS, ANDTHE
RELATIONSHIP BEWTEENCONTRACTLENGTH
AND COLA GENEROSITY
The models discussed in the previous two sections provide a number of
insights into the determinants of COLA provisions in union contracts.
They are not structured in a way, however, that enable us to address a
set of related issues. These include, what determines the length of col-
lective bargaining agreements? How do COLA provisions vary with contract
duration? What determines the size of deferred wage increases that are
not contingent on the price level in multiperiod contracts? Is there a
trade—off between deferred increases and COLA provisions? To answer these
questions one must move to a multiperiod model and we do so in this and
the following section.
We consider for simplicity a two—period model in which neither firms
nor workers can borrow or lend. Let a subscript 1 (2) denote period
1 (2). A representative worker's utility is given by
(19) U =U1(w1/p1)+ 1J2(w2/p2)20
and the firm's utility by
(20) V =V1(1/p1)+V2(i2/p2)
where the within—period utility functions may differ to allow for dis-
counting and other factors.
The production function in period i (for i equal to 1 or 2) can be written
(21) Q. =f.(L.,X.,e1.)
and this function may differ between periods to allow for productivity
growth. Finally, the inverse demand functions and the prices of nonlabor





Notethat this specification also both allows the demand function and input
price schedules to change between periods and the effects of unanticipated
inflation to persist over time, so that unanticipated inflation in period
1 may affect the demand curve and other input prices in period2.23 While
the vector of error terms e1 =(e11,e21,e31)
and e2 =(e12,e72,e32)
are21
assumedto be independent ofthe real izedvaluesof p1 andp2,they
arenotrequired to be independent of each other.
The wage that will prevail in the secondperiodof the contract can
be written as
(24) w2 =w1y()
where w1 is the wage that prevails expost in period 1, equal to
p2/p1 is the actual relative increase in the price level in the second
period, and y() is the multiplier that translates the wage in period
1 into the wage in period 2. We assume that the realization of is
independent of the realization of p1 and that its expected value (the
expected inflation rate in period 2) is ,thesame expected rate as in
period 1. It is straightforward to see that the deferred wage change, as
a percentage of the wage that prevails in period 1 is given by D minus
one where
(25) D =y(l).
When D Is greater than (less than) unity a deferred increase (decrease)
is called for in the contract.
As before, the firm will always choose the variable inputs in each




andall contracts that optimally share inflation risks can be obtaintd
by choosing indexation schemes w1(p1) and v() tomaximize




As in Section II, it is useful to define the following expressions
(remembering that in general each of these may vary and hence is not neces-
sarily a parameter)
(28).theelasticity of the wage rate in period i w.r.t. the
change in the price level in period i
a the elasticityof the firm's demand curve in period i
w.r.t. unanticipated inflation in that period
a* the elasticity of the firm's demand curve in period 2
wr.t. unanticipated inflation in period 1
b1 the elasticity of other input pricesin period I w.r.t.
unanticipated inflation in that period
b* the elasticity of other input prices in period 2 w.r.t.
unanticipated inflation in period 1
A1 the elasticity of real valueadded in period i w.r.t.
a change in the price level in period I
A* the elasticity of real value added in period 2 w.r.t. a
change in the price level in period 1
Using derivations similar to those found in Appendix A, one can obtain
expressions for the optimal degree of indexation in each period23
+w1N (m, +wyN)y
I. F * I E V A +V.)A -—-.r—
C1 11 p 1 PP
(29) =1+
2
—4u +Eu) wN 2 1 pp
(E v'+' + V"+ V" Y)
U'+ EUt -




p1,e2 2 2 p1 p
(30) 2
E U"p 2 2.. 2
1p1 p1 w1 w
£IEV'—\+---Ev"—
w1\p1,e, 2 p1) p1,e2 2 2
p1
p1 2 p1
Note that we have restricted the way in which inflation in period 1
may affect the wage rate in period 2 by the specification of (24). Efficient
sharing of inflation risks would in general require the second period wage
to depend directly on inflation in p&riod 1, not only indirectly via the
latter's effect on wages in period 1. In the more general case the expres-
sions for c1, C2t and the elasticity of wages in period 2 with respect to
prices in period 1 would be similar to equation (12), the optimal degree
of indexation in the one—period model. The complexity of (29) and (30)
arises for two reasons. First, since unanticipated inflation in period 1
affects the real value added in both periods, the degree of indexation in
period 1 depends on both A1 and A*. Second, since thi elasticity of
wages in period 2 with respect to inflation in that period must (by (24))
be independent of the actual inflation rate in period 1, optimal risk
sharing requires that the elasticity of wages with respect to inflation
in each period depend upon the distribution of inflation in the other
period.2
While it is possible for one to analyze the determinants of wage
iridexation in each of the two periods in this general case, for our
purposes it is much more useful to make a setof further simplifying
assumptions. Suppose, first, that p1 and are identically and
independently distributed, as are e and e2. Next, supposethat the
workers' and the firm's utility functions both exhibit equal constant
relative risk aversion (S) and can be written
(19a)U =U(w1/p1)+ pU(w2/p2) and
(20a)V =V(n1/p1)+ pV(n2/p2)
where p(>O) is a discount factor common to both workersand firms.
Suppose, also, that the firm's production function canbe written
as a Cobb—Douglas function
(21a) Q =LX.t11e1
where t1 equals one in period 1 (t111) and t1. equals t1(>O)
in
period 2 (t1ft1). Larger values for t1 indicate higherexpected rates
of productivity growth in this formulation.
Finally, suppose the inverse demand functions and the input price
functions are of constant—elasticity type and are given respectivelyby
(22a) q1 =p1Q1 P1 e21
—1/nmyaa





Herey(S) is the degree of serial correlation in the effect of unantici-
pated Inflation on the demand function (input prices). If y(S) equals
zero, unanticipated inflation in period 1 has no effect on the demand
curve (input prices) in period 2. In contrast if y(5) equals unity then
unanticipated inflation in period 1 has the same effect on demand (input
prices) in period 2 as unanticipated inflation in period 2 does. The expected
growth between periods in real demand is given, in the absence of any
unanticipated inflation by t2 and the expected growth in input prices is
similarly given by t.
Solving equation (26) for the optimal input levels, X1 and X2, and








where A (=A1A2) is the now constant elasticity of real
value added w.r.t. the increases in the aggregate
price level in the same period,
A* =aybS*8 (=A) is the now constant elasticity of the real
value added in period 2 w.r.t. the increase in
the aggregate price level in the previous period,
(eje2ie3j8)l is the composite random multiplicative shock
to real value added in period i26
t =(4t2t3)""18
is the expected growth in reaL value added




Moreover, Appendix C shows that the magnitude of the deferred payment
is given by
(32) D =
Finally,substituting (31) and (32) into (29) an (3O) and making use of
the other specific assumptions we have made one can show that the formulas
for the optimal degree of indexatiori become
(33)c 1 + ((A +*)/(1 + k)) f
24
c2al+A
where k apD1_SE(lis the common, for workers and the firm, ratio
p
of the expected marginal utility in period 1 from an increase in the wage
in period 1 to the expected marginal utility in period 2 of an increase in
the wage in period 1, when the rate of inflation in period 1 equals its
expected value.
Equations (32) and (33) immediately highlight a numberof points.
First, with the assumptions we have made, the formula for the optimal degree
of indexation inthesecond period i idntical to the formula for the
optimal degree of indexation in the one—period model(seefootnote 22).
Second, the deferred increase D i proportioni1 to the expected growth27
in real value added which the firm faces (t) when unanticipated inflation
is zero in both periods. While the expected rate of productivity growth
(t1) influences this variable, so does the expected growth in demand (c2)
andthe expected growth in other input prices (t3). Third, unless the
elasticity of real value added with respect to the increase in the price
level in the same period (A) is zero, the expected inflation rate
influences the size of the deferred increase, with higher expected infla-
tion rates leading to lower (higher) deferred increases if A is greater
(less) than zero.25 Moreover, any parameter that influences A (a, b, r,
will have opposite effects on the size of the deferred increase and on the
degree of wage indexation in the second period. There is, then, a trade—off
between COLA provisions and deferred wage increases.
What about the extent of wage indexation in the first period of the
two—period contract? Is it larger or smaller than the extent of indexation
that would prevail in a one—period contract (1 + A)? With workers and
firms having the same relative risk aversion, perfect sharing of p1 —risks
in the first period would require that w1 and IT1havethe same elasticity
with respect to p1, and hence thatc.. would equal 1 + A. On the
other hand, due to the serial correlation in the effect of unanticipated
inflation on demand and on input prices, unanticipated inflation in period
I also affects the wages and profit in period 2, and perfect sharing of
p1 —risksin the second period would require that w2 and 112 have the
same elasticity with respect to p1, and hence that the elasticity of w2
with respect to p1 would equal 1 + A*. However, since w2 may depend
on p1 only through w1, the elasticity of the wage with respect to p1
is constrained to be the same In the two periods, and unless A =
someInefficiency In the sharing of p1 —risksis unavoidable.28
Equation (33) shows that a weighed average of 1 + A and1 + is
chosen, where the weights when p1 equals depend only onk26
It is clear that the degree of indexation is larger in the first
period of the two—period contract than it is in the one—period contract
(recall the latter equals the degree of indexation in the second period
of the two—period contract) only if A is less than A*. The latter
requires that
(34) ay— b6 > a—
Isthis likely to occur? While no general theoretical statements can
be made, we can consider two special cases. First, suppose that b equals
zero, so that unanticipated inflation does not influence input prices.If
the degree of indexation in period 2 is less than complete (c2 <1),which
is typically the case, then A and hence a will be less than zero. In
this case, (34) will be satisfied as long as y <1.That is, the extent
of ndexaton will be greater during the first period of the two—period
model as long as the effect of unanticipated inflation on the firm's demand
curve depreciates overtime (y <
Second,suppose that b is not equal to zero but thatthe effect of
unanticipated inflation on the demand and input price curves depreciates
at the same rate (y =5).In this case, again as long as indexation is
less than complete, so that A and a —bBare both less than zero, it
follows that if y is less than unity the extent of indexation will again
be greater during the first period of the two—period contract.29
These special cases suggest that a reasonable hypothesis totest
empirically is,thatas long as the observed extent of indexation is less
than unity in the second period of a two—periodcontract, the extent
of indexation will be higher in the first period. Since the formerequals
the extent of indexation in the one—period contract, onaverage the extent
of indexation will be higher in the two—period contract. Putmore generally,
one might expect to observe contracts of longer durations having more
generous COLA provisions. Since the same factors that influence the
generosity of a COLA also influence the probability of COLA coverage (see
Section III), one should expect to observe the incidence of COLA's ircreas—
ing with contract duration. In fact, this occurs.28
V. THEOPTIMUM DURATION OF LABOR CONTRACTS
The lastsection suggested that, other things equal, the extent of
indexation will be greater in a multiperiod contract than in a single
period contract. But, what determines the optimal duration of a collective
bargaining agreement? Clearly the parties to the agreement must consider
the benefits and costs of contracts of different lengths and it is to this
question that we now turn. For expository purposes we shall continue to
contrast one— and two—period contracts.
Consider first the benefit side. We have emphasized before that,
because inflation in the first period(p1) can affect wages in the second
period (w2) only through its effect on wages in the first period
(w1),
inflation risks are generally not shared efficiently in the two—period
contrLct. Straightforward calculation shows that efficient sharing of
inflation risks in the two—period model would require that the optimal30
degree of wage indexation would be equal in the two periods
(35) c1 =£21+A
and that the base wage in period two would be the base wage in period one
multiplied by
(36)
Suppose that instead of the two—period contract,the union and the
firm negotiate a sequence of two one—period contracts that actuallyhave
the properties specified in (35) and (36). That is, they actually agree
in each period to have the extent of indexation calledfor in (35) and
agree at the time they negotiate thesecond contract to have a deferred
increase called for by (36). Such a sequence of contracts mightarise if
they consider each contract negotiation as an incidentin a long—term rela-
tionship, if they are concerned with total expected utilityrather than
expected utility for any single period, and i theyseek to negotiate a
contract in period two which insures that all inflationrisks are shared
efficiently, when considered as of the time of the first negotiation.Such
a sequence of two one—period contracts would clearlybe preferred to the
two—period contract.
The sequence of two one—period contracts has costs aswell as benefits,
however. These costs are of two types. First, there arecosts to the
employer and the union of conducting collective bargainingnegotiations.
These are the explicit and implicit resource costs ofthe negotiations
process including, but not limited to,the time diverted from production,31
contract administration, and planning activities. While lostoutput due
to strikes is an example of such costs, we emphasize that these costsmay
be substantial even in the absence of a strike or threat of strike.
Multiperlod contracts obviously reduce the frequency with which these
costs are incurred.
Second, since the two oñe—perod contracts arenegotiatedsequentially,
there is invariably some uncertainty, as of periodone, as to what the terms
of the second contract will be. Even if, onaverage, the outcomes in the
second contract correspond to (35) and (36), theuncertainty will generate
costs for the parties if they are risk averse. Multiperiod contracts reduce
this form of uncertainty.
The choice of contract duration obviously involves aweighting of the
loss from inefficient sharing of inflation risks if a multiperiodcontract
is chosen with the loss from additional bargaining costs and theuncertainty
about the second period contract if two one—period contractsare chosen.
To see the implications of this point, letCb be the fixed real bargaining
costs of each round of contract negotiations. Suppose, for simplicity,
that the uncertainty in period one about the period two contractoccurs
with respect to the base wage in period two and that this hasan expected
value (as of period one) that is implied by equation (36) anda coefficient
of variation of b Then using the same techniques thatare used in
Appendix B, one can show that the total real amount that the workers
and the firm are jointly willing to pay in period i in orderto have













While in general one cannot observe the continuousvariables H1 and H2,
one can observe whether a contract is two periodslong and it is reasonable
to postulate in empirical implementations that
(39) H 1if H1 + H2 + u >0
0 otherwise
Here H equals one if a two—period contract ischosen and zero if two one—
period contracts are chosen, and u is arandom variable that summarizes
all other unobservable forces that may influence contractduration.
it immediately follows from (37) to (39) that
(40) (a) H/cb >0
(b)''b >0
(c) H/ =0
(d) H/y 0 as a(A —A*) 0
(e) H/S 0 as b(A —A*)0
An increase in the cost of concluding collective bargainingnegotiations
(cb) or in the uncertaintyin the first period associated with the sequence
of two one—period contracts due to not knowingwhat the wage bargain will be33
in the second period both obviously increase the probability of
observing a two—period contract. Since the expected inflation rate ()
doesnot affect the expected utility from contracts of either duration, it
does not affect the choice of contract length.
The results for serial correlation in the effects of unanticipated
inflation on demand (y) and other input prices (6) can be explained as
follows. We know that if A* equals A, a two—period contract distributes
inflation risk efficiently and dominates two one—period contracts. Given A,
the more A* deviates from A, in absolute value, the less efficient is
the distribution of inflation risks in the two—period contract, and conse-
quently, the smaller would be the net benefits from having such a contract.
Since
(41) A*/y 0 as a0and
0 as b0
the results for the effects of serial correlation, in unanticipated inflation
on demand and other inputs prices fo1lo directly.
The remaining parameters unfortunately influence the length of contract
in complicated ways. For example, the uncertainty about the aggregate
inflation rate (&)affectsH both directly and through its effect on k.
Without still further restrictive assumptions, unambiguous implications
about the signs of the effects of ,S (risk aversion), a and b (demand
and input price elasticities with respect to unanticipated inflation),
(the firm's ownpriceelasticity of demand), and $(theelasticity of
output w.r.t. non—labor input) cannot be drawn. All of these parameters do
affect, however, the optimum duration of contracts.34
VI. TEMPORARY LAYOFFS ANDCOLACOVERAGE
In this final theoretical section, we return to a one—period model
with indexation of wages, but allow employment to be variable across
states—of—the—world. This section stresses that temporary layoffs and
the extent of indexation are simultaneously determined and highlights the
role that several parameters of the unemployment inêurance (UI) system
29
play.
Suppose that the nominal unemployment benefits that a laid off worker
receives in a period is Wb• The benefit level may be specified as a
function of the individual's previous earnings; what is important for our
purposes is that wb is not contingent on the realized pricelevel during
the period.
To capture the essence of the imperfectly experience rated aspect of
the UI system, we assume that the nominal unemployment insurance tax that
the firm must pay in the period is —L)+ T. Here L is the number
of union members actually employed during a period which implies, given the
union membership level N, that N —Lworkers are on temporary layoff.
If r is less than one, experience rating is said to be imperfect and the
firm does not bear the full marginal cost of the UI benefits that its laid
off workers receive. If r is equal to one, the system is perfectly
experience rated. Finally, if the firm is paying either the minimum or
maximum tax rate, so that laying off an additional worker will not increase
its UI tax rate, then r will equal zero (and T will bepositive)°
In the presence of UI taxes, the firm's profit function becomes
(42) r =pg[f(L,X),1f(L,X)—ph()X—wL—b(N
—L)—T35
where for simplicity we have assumed that there is no residualuncertainty
In the demand (e1), production function(e2) or inthe price of non—
labor inputs (e3).
Suppose that the utility of a laid off worker isZ(wb/p), with
Z' >0,and that the utility of an employed worker continuesto be U(w/p);
Z can be sufficiently general to allow for nonworktime to yield positive
utility. If each worker has the same, probability of being laid off
(1 —CL/N)),a worker's expected utility, given the price level,wage rate
and employment level is (L/N)U(w/p) + (1 —
(L/N))Z(wb/p).
As before, we do not attempt to fully describe thebargaining process
by which a firm and a union reach a contract settlement. Contractswhich
provide for efficient sharing of inflation risks, however, willrequire
that both the wage rate and the employment level willdepend upon the price
level and all such contracts can be found bychoosing wage and employment




where larger values of A again indicate that the firm winsa greater share
of the "pie", p will be equal to (greater than) zero if we are ina layoff
(full employment) state of the world, and we have assumed a unique solution
exists.
It is straightforward to show that the optimum wage and employment




That is, the worker's loss of utility from beinglaid off, divided by
the marginal utility from raising the wage rate when employed should be
set equal to the marginal real profit that the firm obtainsfrom increas-
ing employment.
Now if we hold the wage schedule, w(p), constant, aswell as p, N,
and Wb partially differentiating (44) with respectto r implies
31
that
(45) L/3r =— (wb/p)/[2(/p)IaL2
>0
Asthe second order conditions for a maximum require that the term in
brackets be negative, it immediately follows that
(46) aL/sr >0.
Because increased marginal experience ratingincreases the cost of a layoff
to the firm, increases In r lead to higheremployments and hence to fewer
layoffs being associated with eachrealization of the price level.
Similarly, holding w, p, N, and r constantand partially differen-
tiating (44) with respect to Wb oneobtains that
(47) L/wb =- (r—(Z'/U'))[2(/p)/L2
Since the bracketed term is negative,the effect of increasing UI
benefits on the employment level is the same sign asr —(Z'/U').With
imperfect experience rating r is lessthan one and if the marginal
utility of income does not depend onwhether the individual is working,-
37
then risk aversion on the part of workers and UIbenefits that are less
than the wage in each state—of—the—world(wb <w(p))giarantee that
32 V/U' is greater than 1. As a result,
(48) 3L/wb <0
Higher UI benefit levels should lead to lower employment andhence more
layoffs.
To obtain implications about the effect ofchanging UI system para-
meters on the optimal degree of wage indexation,we contrast a realiza-
tion of the price level for which there arelayoffs (L(p) <N),with a
realization in which all union members areemployed. Assuming that the
wage, but not necessarily the employment level, in the unemployment state
is unchanged when the UI parameters arechanged, we investigate what
happens to the wage in the full employment state.
Let a subscript L indicate the unemploymentstate and an N the
full—employment state. It is straightforward to show that the maximization
of (43) requires that
(49) UIu =V/v
Differentiating with respect to r for a constantWLallowingL and









Since /L is less than zero andL/r is greater than zero
(from (45)) it follows that increased experiencerating leads to a higher
wage in the full—employment state.Thus, as long as the price level in
the full—employment state is less than (greaterthan) the price level in
the underemployment state, increases in experiencerating increase
(decrease) the extent of wage indexation.That is
(51) h/ar0as
Which of these situations is more likely toprevail? One can show
that the answer hinges on the valueof A, the firm's elasticity ofreal
value added with respect to the aggregate pricelevel. Other things equal,
(52) as AO
From (13) we know that if A <0indexation will be less than complete
(c <1).Hence,
(53) ac/sr0as c 1
As long as indexation is less than complete,an increase in experience
rating will lead to an increase inthe extent of wageindexatiofl.33
By similar reasoning, holding rconstant and allowing L and wN







Substituting (47) into (54) and noting that the product of al.1 of the
termsoutside the brackets in (54) is negative, it follows that
r
, 2
(55) sign of =signof fr(N —L)+(r—-j-) - ( () b
The two terms within the brackets have opposite signs and henceone
cannot unambiguously determine the sign ofwN/Bwb without further assump-
tions. Note, however, that the smaller the extent of experiencerating
(the smaller r), the more the second (negative) term dominates. Indeed,
if r equals zero, we unambiguously know that increasing UI benefits will
lead to a lower wage in the full—employment state. Following thelogic
used before, one can conclude in this case that
(56) C/Wb > 0as 1
That is, if experience rating is zero (r =0)an increase in UI
benefits will decrease (increase) the extent of wage indexation, as long
as indexation is less than complete. More generally, if experience rating
is positive, but sufficiently small to leave (55) negative, the above
result will continue to hold. While we have not formally modelled the
forces that influence the decision to have an indexed contract in the
variable employment model, Section III suggests that mostparameters that
influence the degree of indexation, if it exists, also influence the proba-
bility of observing an indexed contract in a similar manner. Thus, it also
seems likely that increased UI benefits will reduce the probability of
observing an indexed contract.40
VII. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES: TWO—DIGIT
MANUFACTURINGINDUSTRY DATA
Thepreceeding sections have presented aseries of theoretical models
that sought to ascertain the variablesthat influence the existence and
generosity of COLA provisions in unioncontracts, the magnitude of deferred
wage increases that are not contin5enton the price level, the durationof
labor contracts, and the level of temporarylayoffs. The variables that
the models suggest may play important roles are
summarized in Table 4; as
one can see they are a varied lot encompassing
characteristics of the firm's
demand curve, employee and employer risk aversion,
characteristics of the
bargaining relationship, macroeconomicvariables, and parameters of the
unemployment insurance system.
This section and the following one provide
initial empirical tests of a
few of the hypotheses generated by these
models. In this section we use
data at the two—digit manufacturing industry
level of aggregation and focus on
the determinants of both the fraction of theworkers covered by major collec-
tive bargaining agreements that area-iso covered by a COLA provision and
the industry layoff rate. In the nextsection, we use data at the individual
collective bargaining agreement level and analyzethe determinants of COLA
coverage, characteristics ofCOLA's (when they exist), and the durationof
collective bargaining agreements.
Our approach in this section is to estimateequations of the form
13 4 3
(57) Fit jEj.OjiVjjt
+ k1k1ak1t + + m1'm1'it + u11
and41
13 4 3
(58) 2...),, v. + •a +LUI.+Dd.+u itj1 j2jitk1 k2 kit 2iml tn2it Lit
HereFit represents the fraction of the workers that are covered by
major collective bargaining agreements in industry i in year t that
are also covered by COLA provisions and represents the three—year
average layoff rate in industry i in yeart.3 The v's are variables
that reflect personal characteristics of unionized workers in the industry
and the industry bargaining structure, the a's are estimates of several
demand related variables (elasticity of industry demand w.r.t. unanticipated
inflation (a1), serial correlation in the effect of unanticipated infla-
tion on industry demand (a2 = i) the expected growth of demand (a3 = t),
and pure random variations in demand and productivity (a4 = 4fl,UI
represents the average net unemployment insurance replacement rate in the
industry ——theaverage weekly UI benefits divided by the average weekly
net (after tax) loss of income incurred by laid—off unemployed workers in
the industry, the d are industry and year dummy variables, the u random
ih1 -rrl1 4,-T fl t-crc tr, hø cf 4ini t A A inrr , , —, ..-
pletedescription of the data, including its sources, is found in Appendix
D and a complete list of the explanatory variables is found in Table 5.
Several comments should be made about this specification. First, we
use data pooled across three years. Since many labor contracts are long—
term in nature, we do not use adjacent years' data which would allow for
the possibility of the same contract influencing the industry "outcome"
variables in more than one year. Rather, we use data for 1975, 1978 and 1981.
Second, it is difficult to make unambiguous predictions about the
expected signs of many of the v variables because they do not always42
correspond neatly in a one—to—one fashion with the list ofvariables in
Table 4. For example, bargaining structure variables such as thenumber
of unions in the industry (v2), the percentage of unionizedworkers (v3)
and the percentage of workers covered by multiemployer agreements (v5) may
all be proxies for the costs of having indexed contracts (c.),the costs
of concluding collective bargaining agreements (cb), and theshare of the
"pie" that the employer wins (X). Similarly, while personalcharacteristics
of unionized workers such as mean age (v7), percent married (v5), percent
white (v9), percent male (v10), percent residing inSMSA's (v11) mean
schooling (v12), and mean number of children (v13) mayreflect employee
relative risk aversion (S), some may also influence the costsof conduct-
ing negotiations, the costs of indexed contracts,and indeed employer and
employee demands for long—term employment relationships.As such, we will
not spend alot of time below discussing thesevariables' coefficients.
Third, the estimated parameters of the demand function wereobtained
as follows. Using quarterly data on the consumer priceindex (Pr) from
1970 to 1978, an expected consumer price index series (E(P(t)) was
35
generated using a fourth—order autoregressive model. For each two—
digit manufacturing industry, equations of theform





were then estimated using quarterly data from 1971 to 1978, where S.. is
the value of shipments in industry i in year t, T is a time—trend
term that is incremented quarterly and the u are random error terms.
When equation (59) is used, which assumes that there is no serial correla-
tion in the effects of unanticipated inflation, a1, a3 and a4 are esti-
mated respectively by h12, 'l3 and Similirly,when equation (60)
Is used, which allows for serial correlation in the effects of unanticipated
inflation on demand, one can show that a1, a2, a3 anda4 are given
respectively by h22, h23, h241(1 —h23),and aZ2.36
Fourth, a key explanatory variable is the average unemployment insurance
net replacement rate (UI); the average weekly UI benefits divided by the
average weekly net (after tax) loss of income by laid—off unemployed workers
in the industry. These data are obtained from a large scale microsimulation
modelofthe unemployment insurance system built by the Urban Institute,
and are based on data from the Survey of Income and Education.37
Finally. dummy variables that indicate the year the data are from and
whether the industry Is in durable manufacturing are also included In the
model. The former are meant to control for variations in expected inflation
and in the coefficient of variation of expected inflation over time. The
latter is another proxy for negotiations costs, the elasticity of the firms'
demand curve w.r.t. its own price and the costs of indexed contracts.
Estimates of variants of equations (57) and (58) are found in Tables 5,
6 and 7. The dependent variables in these tables are the fraction of the
workers under major collective bargaining agreements who are covered by a
COLA, the fraction of such agreements that contain COLA's, and the three—.
year average of the Industry layoff rate, respectively. Quite strikingly
a number of key implications of the models are confirmed.44
For example, as suggested in Section VI, higher UI replacement
rates in an industry are associated with a lower probability of observing
an indexed contract (Tables 5 and 6) and a higher level of industry layoffs
(Table 7). These results support the notion that cost of livingindexation
and the level of temporary layoffs are simultaneously determined.
To take another example, an increase in the .elas.ticity of the demand
curve w.r.t. unanticipated inflation (a1) does appear to beassociated
with an increase in the probability of observing an indexed contract
(Tables 5 and 6), as suggested in Section III. Furthermore, theeffect of
an increase in the serial correlation of unanticipated inflation onthe
probability of observing an indexed contract can be shown, from equation
(33), to be the same sign as the elasticity of the demand curve w.r.t.
unanticipated inflation. If Indexation is less than complete (c <1),
which is what one typically observes, ceteris paribus this elasticity will
tend to be less than zero (from (31), which implies that an increase in the
serial correlation parameter should decrease the probability of observing
an indexed contract. In fact (Tables. 5 and 6), this is what wedo observe.
An increase in residual uncertainty does appear to reduce the proba-
bility of observing indexed contracts (Tables 5 and 6); thisresult is
consistent with the theoretical result that degree of indexation declines
with increased residual uncertainty when the optimal degree of indexation
is less than unity and employee relative risk aversion is greater than
employer relative risk aversion (see equation(14)).38 Wliere statistically
significant, increased residual uncertainty also increases the industry
layoff rate (Table 7); a result consistent with one's a priori expectations.45
Also,an increase in the expected growth of demanddoesreduce the
industrylayoff rate (Table 7), as might be expected and, where significant,
appears to increase the probability of observing indexed contracts (Tables 5
and 6). One can show, from (33), that the effect of an increase in the
expected growth of demand is of the same sign as (A* —A)(1—S).Since
it is likely that A* >A,this result is consistent with employees'
relative risk aversion (S) being less than unity.39
Numerous associations between the other explanatory variables, COLA
coverage and the layoff rate are also found. High quit rates, which suggest
less permanent attachment of workers and firms, are associated with less
COLAcoverageand higher layoff rates. With respect to the bargaining
structure variables, an increase in the number of unions in an industry,
which reduces the bargaining power of each union, reduces COLA coverage,
while an increase in the proportion of workers covered by unions increases
it. The latter also is associated with higher layoff rates; a result con-
sistent with the evidence presented by James Medoff (1979). Finally,
increased coverage by xnultiemployer contracts, which tends to reduce wage
competition among firms in an industry also leads to a greater probability
of observing COLA's.
Where statistically significant, the greater the percentage of family
income attributable to the wage earnings of the union member, the greater
the probability of observing COLA coverage. In terms of the discussion in
Section II, this suggests that other forms of family income tend to be
fixed in real rather than nominal terms.
Finally, increases in the mean age of union members and their mean
education level, and decreases in the percentages of them who are married,46
white, or reside in an SMSA, all are (where significant) associated with
increased COLA coverage. The result for whites may reflect their greater
access to capital markets and thus less need for COLA's to stabilize consump-
tion over time. Similarly individuals residing in SMSA's may face more
stable alternative earnings opportunities than individuals residing in
smaller labor markets, again reducing the former's need for COLA coverage.
Finally, higher levels of schooling may reflect higher levels of specific
human capital and increased desire by firms and workers for long—term
employment relations. This would lead to both increased COLA coverage and
lower layoffs; the latter result is observed in Table 7.
In sum, while the results presented in this section can not be des-
cribed as being totally unambiguous, they do generate some support for the
relevance.of the models that we developed in earlier sections.
VIII. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES:
INDIVIDUAL CONTRACT DATA
This section provides further empirical tests of our models using
data on COLA coverage, on the characteristics of COLA's when they exist,
and on the duration of contracts, for individual manufacturing collective
bargaining agreements covering more than 1,000 workers that were on file
with the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1981. The data on the characteristics
of COLA's are of interest because contrary to popular impression, COLA pro-
visions vary widely across union contracts., on a number of dimensions. For
example, they vary in the frequency of review. Some contracts call for
quarterly reviews and adjustments of wages, some for semi—annual reviews,
and still others for annual ones.4° Some allow for a COLA increase in the47
initial year of the contract, while others do not. Other things equal,
the earlier the first cost—of—living adjustment and the more frequent the
reviews, the greater the "yield" of the COLA. That is, the more complete
indexation will be.
To take another example,. COLA provisions also vary in their generosity
per review. Some specify minimum price increases before any cost—of—living
wage increase is granted. Others specify maximum cost—of—living adjustments,
or "caps". Still others specify bands of price increases (e.g., 5 to 7
percent) for which no COLA wage increases will be granted. Clearly, such
provisions affect the yield of a COLA.
Increases are typically specified as a one—cent increase in wages for
each fractional point increase in the consumer price index. Among 102
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major union contracts in 1979, this fraction varied between .3 and .6.
Larger fractions obviously represent less generous COLA's. The generosity
of a COLA provision also depends upon the level of earnings of the covered
employees. Since COLA's typically are specified in absolute terms (so many
cents/hour), the higher the earnings of employees, other things equal, the
42
less generous a COLA will be.
When seeking to ascertain the generosity of a COLA provision, there
are a number of strategies one might follow. First, one might estimate the
eante degree of indexation by the expost degree of indexation; the elas—
ticityofwages with respect to inflation that actually occurred. This is
the approach followed by Hendricks and Kahn (1981).
Its weakness is that given the complex way COLA's are formulated,
this number will typically depend nonlinearly on both the actual level of
inflation and the various COLA provisions. Since the elasticity of wages48
with respect to inflation typically varies with the level of inflation,
it is unclear whether one should attempt to suniinarize the provisions ofa
COLA by this single number. Furthermore, such a number at best would be
an average expost elasticity; it would tell us nothing about the marginal
effect of inflation on wages. Indeed, it is not difficult to think of
circumstances in which contract A shows a greater COLA increase than
contract B, given the actual inflation rate that occurred, but where the
marginal COLA increase for Increments of Inflation would be larger in B
than in A because of a cap on the COLA increase in A. It is unclear in
such a case which contract one would want to argue has the moregenerous
COLA provision.
A second approach is to argue that it is dlfficult to disentangle
COLA increases and the portion of deferred noncontingent wage increases
that are Implicitly based on expectations of inflation.Indeed, if
intracontract real wage changes are generally small, onemight treat them
as being zero and argue that the sum of the percentage deferredwage
increases and the COLA increases that occurred expost, dividedby the
expost inflation rate, is a good measure of the exante elasticity ofwages
with respect to prices.
The theoretical models we presented In Sections IV and V suggest that
such an approach may be incorrect; it is possible to model both the determi-
nants of COLA increases and of deferred increases. Moreover, a simple
numerical example illustrates the empirical difficulties inherent in such
an approach. Consider two contracts. Suppose that the first calls for a
five percent deferred increase and no COLA increase, while the second calls
for no deferred increase, but a one percent COLA increase for each one49
percent increase in prices. If the expost increase in prices was five
percent, the two would yield equal percentage increases in wages and, if
the exante increase in prices was also five percent, the two would also
yield equal expected wage increases. However, the former would provide
workers with no protection against unanticipated inflation, while the
latter would provide them with complete protection. Since we, and Card,
have argued that a major motivation for COLA's is their risk sharing pro-
visions, in particular the sharing of risks due to unanticipated inflation,
it seems strange to argue that the two contracts offer equal COLA protection.43
A third approach, followed by David Card (1982), is to argue that
because of the interdependence between deferred and COLA increases, it makes
little sense to focus on the overall expost change in wages. Rather, Card
measures the exante elasticity by the marginal elasticity of the wage esca-
lator; the cents per point increase in the CPI that the escalator yields
(while active) divided by the real contractual wage at the start of the
contract. The weakness of this approach, of course, is that it ignores the
presence of CAPS, nonlinearities, etc. For example, two contracts may initially
offer the same COLA payment per point incxease in the CPI, but if one has a
CAP on the maximum size of the COLA payment and the other does not, one would
not want to argue that both offer equal COLA protection. The weakness of
his measure then lies in the restriction twhile active".
The discussion above suggests that it may be inappropriate, indeed
nearly impossible, to summarize all of the information about the generosity
of a contract's COLA provisions in a single number. Hence, the strategy
we follow in this section is to use information on a whole vector of contract
provisions and to estimate a set of eleven equations of the form50
(61) Z =F(X)+ u I =1,2,...11
Here is a dichotomous variable that takes on the value of unity
if there is a COLA provision and zero otherwise, Z2 is a polytomous
variable for contracts with COLA's that takes the value of one ifthe
frequence of COLA review after the first year is monthly, twoif it is
quarterly, three if it is semi—annually, and four if it is annually, Z3
is a dichotomous variable that is unity if there is a COLA reviewin the
first year and zero otherwise, and and Z5 are variables that, for
contracts with COLA's, show the number of cents that workerswould receive
for each one—point increase in the CPI and an estimate of the percentage
point increase in wages the workers would receive for each percentage
point increase in the CPI. For contracts with COLA's, Z6 is the natural
logarithm of the number of months until the first COLA review, while Z7
is the logarithm of the contract duration (in months) for all contracts.
Again for contracts with COLA's, Z8 and Z9 are dichotomous variables
that capture the presence of guaranteed mInimum COLA increases and caps, or
maximum permissable COLA increases, respectively. Finally, Z10 and Z11
are variants of Z4 and Z5 that assign the value of zero to contracts
in which COLA's do not exist. The latter two measures combine information
on both the existence of a COLA provision and its generosity.
Each of these variables provides information on either the existence
of a COLA, its generosity, or the duration of the underlying contract. A
stringent test of our models then, is to look at the coefficients of a given
explanatory variable across equations and to see if a consistent patternof
results is present. That is, does it appear that a given variable Is51
influencing each of theoutcomesina way thatis consistent with the under-
lying theoretical models?4
The explanatory variables (the X's) in this specification are similar
to those used in the previous section and are meant to capture the
same forces described there. With the exception of the number of employees
covered by the contract, another proxy for the cost of concluding collective
bargaining negotiations, all are specified at the two— or three—digit
industry level and merged in from other sources. Three variables not
used in the previous section, but included here, are the eight firm concen-
tration ratio, the import/sales ratio in an industry, and wages as a share
of shipments in the industry. The former two are meant to capture competitive
pressures that the firm faces; increased product market competition;
might lead to a reduced willingness to grant COLA's. The latter is a proxy
for the share of labor in total costs. Also included, since the starting
dates of the various contracts span a three—year period, are direct
measures of the expected rate of inflation as of the contract date and
the coefficient of variation of forecasters' expected inflation rates.
These are obtained from the Livingston survey forecasts.'5
The effect of unanticipated inflation on industry demand, the magnitude
of the general trend in industry demand and productivity, and the magnitude
of residual uncertainty are obtained from within three— or four—digit
industry regressions of the form
(62) los(PPIj/P) = +a log(P/E(P)) + +c
where PPI is the producer price index for industry j in period t, P
is the consumer price index in period t, E(P) is the expected consumer52
price index (which is generated as before), and T is a time trendterm.46
These equations are estimated using quarterly data for the 1973—1978 period.47
Because of the small number of observations involved, it proved impossible
to also estimate the parameter that reflected the serial correlation in the
effects of unanticipated inflation on demand.
Table 8 presents estimates of each of the eleven equations. Depending
upon the sample (all contracts or only those with COLA's) and the formof
the dependent variables used, the estimation method is either probit (Zi,
13, Z8, Z9), ordered probit (Z2), ordinary least squares (Z4, Z5, Z6, Z7),
or Tobit (Z1O, Zil). A list of explanatory variables appears in the table,
while a more complete description of the data appears in Appendix D.
The results in this table can best be described as mixed. For
example, an increase in the elasticity of the demand curve with respect
to unanticipated inflation (Xli), where significant, is associated with
more frequent COLA reviews (Z2) and larger COLA increases (110), as sug-
gested in Section II. Increased residual uncertainty, however, is also
associated with more frequent COLA reviews (12), shorter duration until
the first review (Z6), and larger COLA increases (Z5); Section II suggests
that these results should obtain only if the optimal elasticity of wages
with respect to prices is greater than one——a result rarely observed in
these data. To take another example, where significant, higher UI replace-
ment rates are associated with larger COLA increases; this contrasts both
with our theoretical expectations and the estimates of the effects of UI on
the probability of COLA coverage observed in the previous section.48
Some variables perform in a more consistent manner, either across
equations or with respect to our hypotheses. For example, increases In
the import/sales ratio (X7) are associated with decreases in both the53
probability of COLA coverage (Zi) and the size of COLA increases (Z1O, Zil).
Similarly, increases in wages as a share of shipments (X4) are associated with
decreases in the probability of coverage (Zi) and the size of COLA increases
(Z5, Z1O, Zil). As long as the effect of unanticipated inflation on demand
is larger than its effect on other input prices, these latter results are
consistent with the theoretical prediction summarized in Table 3. Finally,
as in the macro results reported in the last section, an increase in the
share of total family income due to the wages of the union members (X25) is
associated with an increase in the COLA payment.
The results for other variables, however, are more ambiguous. For
example, increased unionization in an industry (X5), is associated with
either lower (Z4) or higher (Z1O) COLA payments, depending upon the esti-
mation method used. Similarly, some demographic variables, such as age
(X16), marital status (X17), and SMSA status (X20) affect the probability
of COLA coverage in this micro data set in exactly the opposite direction
that they did in the macro results reported in the previous section.
Table 8 also reports results for a contract duration equation. Contract
length (Z7) is positively associated with the extent of unionization (X5),
durable goods industries (X8), and the trend in productivity and demand
(X12). It is negatively associated with industry concentration (X3) and
the import/sales ratio (X7). Finally, several of the demographic charac-
teristics variables appear to influence it; percent white (XiS) and percent
in SMSA (X20) positively and mean age (X16), percent male (X19), and percent
craftsmen (X22) negatively. While many of these results are in accord with
our prior expectations (from Section V), some are not. For example, one
might have expected situations in which skilled workers were involved (high
values for X22) to be ones in which both firms and workers pushed for long—
term contracts. Apparently, however, this does not occur.54
In sum, the results of this section at best cin be described as mixed.
They are sufficiently ambiguous that they cannot be said to. provide strong
support for the validity of our theoretical models. A possible explanation
for the ambiguity may lie in our method of testing. It may be unreasonable
to expect that one can estimate the effect of an explanatory variable on
ten dimensions of a COLA provision and hope to observe a consistent pattern
of coefficients across equations. After all, the theoretical models provide
hypotheses about the elasticity of wages with respect to prices, notabout
timing of reviews, minimum increase, caps, etc. While we believe our
criticisms of the approaches of previous investigators are valid, our
approach in this section obviously has its ownproblems.49
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has presented a series of theoretical models that sought
to ascertain the determinants of COLA provisions in union contracts,the
generosity of these provisions when they exist, the magnitude ofdeferred
wage increases that are not contingent on the price level,the duration of
labor contracts and the level of temporary layoffs. The factors that we
highlighted were a varied lot and encompassed characteristics of thefirm's
demand curve (including how it responds to unanticipated inflation),
employee and employer risk aversion, characteristics of the bargaining
relationship (including the costs of concluding negotiations), macroeconomic
variables, and parameters of the unemployment insurance system.
Two initial empirical tests of the hypotheses generated by the models
were provided. The first test used data at the two—digit manufacturing
industry level of aggregation and focused on the determinantsof the fraction
of workers covered by COLA provisions and on the industry layoff rate. This55
analysis, which made use of pooled cross—section time—series data, appeared
to confirm a number of key implications of the models. In particular,
higher UI replacement rates were associated both with lower probabilities
of observing indexed contracts and higher levels of layoffs in an industry.
The second test used data at the individual collective bargaining agreement
level and focused on the determinants of COLA coverage, the characteristics
of COLA agreements when they exist, and the duration of labor contracts.
Unfortunately, the results here were much more mixed and did not provide
strong support for the models.
In spite of the mixed nature of these empirical results, we believe
that this paper has demonstrated the usefulness of analyzing the determi-
nants of these union contract provisions in the context of risk—sharing
models. Numerous extensions suggest themselves. At the empirical level,
it is clear that better measures of the "exante degree of indexation" must
be devised. Neither the single parameter measures used by Card (1981) and
Hendricks and Kahn (1982) that are based on exante marginal elasticities
over an initial range and expost wage increases respectively, nor the
multiple (10) parameter measures used by us seems to be appropriate. Using
a single parameter measure based on the COLA increase that would have
resulted if the expected price increase at the time of the negotiations
actually occurred, seems qually inappropriate for reasons we discussed
in Section VIII. At the very least, what is required is a two—parameter
measure that contains information on both the expected COLA wage increase and
the marginal change in the wage increase that would result from unanticipated
inflation.56
We have also only begun to test the implications of the models. One
productive line of testing would focus on the trade—off between COLA.
increases and deferred noncontingent wage increases that was discussed
in Section IV and see if the models proved useful in explaining suchsplits.
Much more work also needs to be done on the determinants of contract dura-
tion and on the effects of UI parameters (both replacement rates and
experience rating) on the COLA—layoff trade—off.
At the theoretical level, an important unresolved issue is why COLA
provisions typically take the form of "X cents per one point increase in
the CPI" rather than "X percent increase inwages for each percentage
increase in the CPI"? As is well known, the former type scheme will tend
to compress wage differentials within a firm, while the latter will keep
them constant? What is needed here are models of uniondecision—making
processes that highlight how heterogeneity of union members and different
voting schemes will, lead to different types of contract provisions. Ulti-
mately, such theoretical modelling would lead to empirical research on the
determinants of the type of COLA provision adopted.
Similarly, the existence of minimum price level increases that are
required before COLA coverage starts in some contracts, and caps or maximum
increases in others, suggests that risk—sharing agreements often existonly
over a subset of possible states of the world. It may be useful to try to
model the conditions that lead such restrictions to occur and then to
empirically test the usefulness of such models.57
Table 1
Coverage of Cost—of--Living Escalator
Provisions in Major Union Contractsa
Annual Percent
Number of Workers Number Covered by Change in the
Covered by Major Cost—of—Living Percent Covered by Consumer Price
Union Contracts Provisions Cost—of—Living Index in the b
Date (millions) (millions) Provisions Previous Year
1/55 7.5 1.7 . 23 —.5
1/57 7.8 3.5 45 2.9
1/58 8.0 4.0 50 3.0
1/59 8.0 4.0 50 1.8
1/60 8.1 4.0 49 1.5
1/61 8.1 2.7 33 1.5
1/62 8.0 2.5 31 1.7
1/63 7.8 1.9 24 1.2
1/64 7.8 2.0 26 1.6
1/65 7.9 2.0 25 1.2
1/66 10.0 2.0 20 1.9
1/67 10.6 2.2 21 3.4
1/68 10.6 2.5 24 3.0
1/69 10.8 2.7 25 4.7
1/70 10.8 2.8 26 6.1
1/71 10.6 3.0 28 5.5
1/72 10.4 4.3 - 41 3.4
1/73 10.5 4.1 39 3.4
1/74 10.3 4.0 39 8.8
1/75 10.2 5.1 50 12.2
11/75 10.2 5.9 58
11/76 10.0 6.0 61 4.8
11/77 9.7 5.8 60 6.8
11/78 9.6 5.6 . 58 9.0
11/79 9.4 5.5 59 13.3
11/80 9.3 5.3 57 12.4
10/81 9.0 5.1 - 56 8.958
Table 1 (continued)
Source: H.M. Douty, Cost—of—Living Escalator Clauses andInflation (Council on
Wage and Price Stability, August 1975), Table 1 (fordata through
January 1975).
Monthly Labor Review, January issues for 1976—1982 (fordata from
November 1975 on). 1982 Economic Report of the President (Washington,
D.C., 1981), Table B55 (consumer price index).
aContracts covering 1,000 or more workers in private indutry. Prior to 1966
the construction, service, finance, and real estate industries wereexcluded.
bp1 changes are measured from December to December for all years. Hence, the
1/55 figure covers the 12/53—12/54 period, the 1/75 figure coversthe 12/73—
12/74 period. The 11/75 figure covers the 12/74—12/75 period, etc.59
Table 2
Prevalence of Cost—of—Living Adjustment (COLA) Clauses




SIC Covered Number of Workers Covered Contracts
Code/Industry (000's) Contracts by COLA's With COLA's
Total 9,333 1,989 57.0 38.8
10Metal Mining 56 14 79.5 78.6
11Anthracite Mining 2 1 100.0 100.0
12BitumInous Coal Mining 160 1 0.0 0.0
15Building Construction,
General Contractors 685 170 7.2 5.3
16Construction Other
than Building Const. 471 118 14.5 9.3
17Construction—Special
Trade Contractors 432 201 11.7 10.4
20Food & Kindred Prods. 313 99 31.6 34.3
21Tobacco Manufacturing 28 8 88.0 75.0
22Textile Mill Prods. 46 19 6.5 10.5
23Apparel and Other
Finished Products 486 55 32.2 18.2
24Lumber and Wood Prods. 66 15 4.2 13.3
25Furniture & Fixtures 28 17 35.9 4L2
26Paper & Allied Prods. 98 66 3.8 3.0
27Printing & Publishing 63 33 34.7 24.2
28Chemicals & Allied
Products 83 44 27.4 27.3
29Petroleum & Related 37 19 0.0 0.0
30Rubber & Misc. Prods. 83 15 81.5 66.7
31Leather 38 16 0.0 0.0
32Stone, Clay, Glass and
Concrete Products 91 36 73.2 63.9
33Primary Metals 476 118 94.6 87.3
34Fabricated Metals 116 59 78.5 71.2
35Machinery, Except
Electrical 289 93 93.4 88.2

















































































Source: Douglas LeRoy, "Scheduled Wage Increases and Cost—of—Living Provisions














































Summary of Main Results:
One—Period Fixed Employment Model
Degree of Probability of
Indexat ion Indexat ion
Increase in Parameter (c) (B)
elasticity of demand curve w.r.t.
unanticipated inflation (a) + +
elasticityof other input prices w.r.t.
unanticipated inflation (b)
elasticity of firm demand w.r.t. its
real price (ri) 0 as a —b as a —b
elasticity of output w.r.t. other
input () as a b as a b
employee risk aversion CS) as A0 +
expected inflation () 0 0
coefficient of variation in
expected inflation () 0 +
costs of indexation (c1) **
purerandom variation in demand,
productivity and other input —
prices as A(S—R) ; 0*
*
Seethe text for the specific assumptions necessary to obtain these results.
**
Theeffect will depend on the distribution of the cost between workers
and firm as well as on many parameters of the model.62
Table 4
Variables That Influence COLAProvisions,Deferred Increases,
Contract Duration, or Temporary Layoffs
Symbol Variable
a elasticity of demand curve w.r.t. unanticipated inflation
b elasticity of non—labor input prices w.r.t. unanticipated inflation
elasticity of firm's demand w.r.t. its real price
8 elasticity of output w.r.t. nonlabor inputs
S employee relative risk aversion
R employer relative risk aversion
p expected aggregate inflation rate
coefficient of variation in expected inflation
c. costs of having indexed contracts
coefficient of variation of the pure random variation in demand,
productivity and other input prices.
N nonlabor income (family income other than the employee's
labor income)
y serial correlation in the effect of unanticipated inflation on
thedemand curve
serial correlation in the effect of unanticipated inflation on
otherinput prices
t expectedgrowth in real valued added when unanticipated
inflation is zero
Cb
cost of each round of collective bargaining negotiations
coefficient of variation of the uncertainty about the size of non—
contingent wage increases in future short—term contracts
r extent of experience rating in the UI system
level of UI benefits
A share of the "pie" that the employer wins63
TableS
Detcrminnnts of Fraction of Workers Covered by a COLA.
By2—Digit M.inufacturing: 1975, 1978, 1981
(absolute value of t—statistic)5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
vi —.117. (2.9) —.054 (1.8) —.056 (1.5) —.039 (1.2) .008 (0.1) .014 (0.3) .142 (1.6)
v2 —.008 (1.5) —.002 (0.4) —.017 (3.3) —.007 (1.4) —.012 (2.2) —.007 (1.6) —.009 (1.1)
v3 .087 (1.7) .040 (0.9) .268 (4.7) .141 (2.7) .222 (3.6) .133 (2.5 .144 (1.8)
v4 —.001 (0.1) —.008 (1.1) —.007 (0.8) —.011 (1.5) —.011 (1.2) —.011 (1.5) —.012 (1.3)
vS .559(1.5) .769 (2.9) .440 (1.4) .696 (2.6) .220 (0.7) .540 (1.8) .263 (0.6)
v6 4.315 (2.9) 5.123 (4.3) .422 (0.3) 2.795 (2.0) —.192(0.1) 1.980 (1.2) .290 (0.1)
v7 .048 (1.8) .114 (4.5) .031 (1.3) .098 (3.9) .054 (2.0) .100 (4.0) .089 (2.4)
vS —6.357 (3.5) —4.325 (3.1) —6.127 (4.2) —5.010 (3.7) —3.789 (1.8) —3.524 (1.9) —1.255 (0.5)
v9 —1.983 (1.1) —6.597 (3.1) 1.255 (0.7) —4.914 (2.3) 1.522 (1.0) —3.432 (1.4) —2.162 (0.7)
vlO —.933 (1.7) —.146 (0.4) .152 (0.3) .524 (1.2) .653 (1.1) .685(1.5) 1.072 (1.9)
vii .185 (0.1) .688 (0.7) —4.176 (3.2) —2.172 (1.6) —3.053 (2.1) —1.634 (1.1) —1.365 (0.7)
v12 .329 (1.0) .360 (1.2) .759 (2.6) .732 (2.3) .390 (1.0) .442 (1.1) .193 (0.4)
vl3 1.187 (1.2) 1.091 (1.2) —2.061 (2.0) —1.084 (1.0) —1.481 (1.3) .685 (0.6) .607 (0.4)
.078 (2.6) .044 (1.6) .065 (2.6) .056 (2.2) .031 (1.0) .003 (1.0) .000 (0.0)
*2 —.995 (3.0) —.606 (1.7) —.664 (1.9) —.834 (2.0)
27.120 (1.5) 1.006 (0.7) 33.506 (2.2) 1.891 (1.3) 10.794 (0.5) 1.752 (1.2) 1.111 (0.6)
*4 —59.172 (2.2) —5.914 (0.2) —75.091 (3.3)—25.556 (1.0)—43.323 (1.4) —7.547 (0.2) 1.144 (0.0)
UI —1.754 (1.6) —1.226 (1.2) —2.637 (1.8)
Dl .731 (4.8) .413 (2.8) .724 (4.9) .431 (3.0) .435 (2.5)
D2 .066 (1.1) .091 (1.9) .099 (1.6) .112 (2.2) —.063 (1.0)
D3 .093 (1.4) .085 (1.6) .138 (2.0) .127 (2.0)
LU
k2 .771 .872 .870 .904 • .869 .908 .945
60 60 60 60 60 60 40Table 5 (continued)
where vi 3—year average of the quit rate
v2 number of unions in the industry
v3 percentage of unionired workers in the industry
v4 3—year average of the profit rate
vS percentage of workerscoveredby multietnployer agreements in the industry
v6 percentage of income due to wage earnings of the union member
v7 mean age of union members
v8 percentage of union members who are tharried
v9 percentage of union memberswhoare white
vl0 percentage of union members who are male
vil percentage of union members residing in SMSA'a
v12 mean schooling level of union members
v13 mean number of children in married union members' familiea
Dl 1—durable goods industry, 0-not
D2 11981. 0—not
D3 1—1978, 0—not
UI average UI net replacement rate —averageweekly UI benefits/average weekly net (after tax)
lossof income by laid—off unemployed workers in the industry
LU lagged (3 years) dependent variable
estimate of elasticity of industry demand w.r.t. unanticipated inflation
estimate of serial correlation in the effect of unanticipated inflation on industry demand
*3
estimate of expected growth in demand
$4
estimate of pure random variation in demand, productivity, and other input prices
a See Appendix U for a description of data sources.
64Table 6
Detertoants of the Fractiur of Cuntracts that Contain COLA',,
By2—Digit Manuf.icturlng Industries: 1975. 1978. 1981
(absolute value of t—statistic)
65
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)








































v5 .337(1.0) .617(2.6) .207 (0.8) .507(2.3) —.001(0.0) .396(1.7) —.012(0.1)
v6 4.048(3.2) 4.982(4.6) .478 (0.4) 2.283(2.0) —.106(0.1) 1.697(1.3) —.102(0.1)

























































v12 .258(0.9) .392(1.5) .631 (2.7) .798(3.3) .281(1.0) .590(1.9) .421(1.3)
v13 1.319(1.5) 1.018(1.3) —1.594 (1.9) —1.425(1.5) —1.044(1.2) —1.137(1.2) —1.158(1.3)
a .068(2.7) .053(2.2) .056 (2.8) .066(3.2) .024(1.0) .047(1.7) .019(0.7)
*2 —.656(2.2) —.230(0.9) —.272(1.0) —.486(1.9)
*3 21.984(1.4) 1.915(1.4) 28.046 (2.3) 2.862(2.4) 6.492(0.4) 2.763(2.3) 1.744(1.5)
*4 51.388(2.2) —8.182(0.3)—66.145 (3.6)—30.104(1.4)—35.998(1.5) —17.134(0.7)—12.428(0.4)
—1.664(1.9) —.883(1.0) —1.632(1.8)
Dl .665.(5.5) .467(4.0) .659(5.6) .480(4.1) .420(3.6)
D2 .079 (1.7) .101(2.6) .111(2.3) .116(2.8) —.087(2.2)
D3 .117 (5.1) .105(2.4) .161(2.9) .136(2.6)
LD
See Table 5 for variable definitions.
k2 .790 .878 .886 .929 .896 .924 .972
n 60 60 60 60 60 60 40Table 7
Determinant. of the industry Layoff Rate (3—Year Average),
By 2—Digit Manufacturing Industry: 1975, 1978, 1981
(absolute value of ,t—statietic)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
vt .006(6.3) .006(7.5) .004(4.9) .004(5.7) .003(2.2) .001(0.8) .000(0.0)
v2 .000(0.6) —.000(0.9) .000(1.5) .000(0.9) .000(0.6) .000(1.4) .000(1.6)
vS .004(3.1) .005(4.2) .003(2.6) .002(1.8) .004(3.0) .003(2.5) .003(1.9)














































v8 —.002(0.0) .022(0.5) —.016(0.5) —.014(0.4) —.066(1.4) —.122(2.9) —.197(3.0)
v9 .215(5.2) .268(4.7) .189(5.0) .171(3.1) .184(4.9) .065(1.1) .043(0.5)














































a —.001(1.9) —.002(2.4) —.001(2.1) —.001(1.8) —.000(0.6) .001(0.9) .001(1.2)
£2 —.029(3.0) —.024(2.6) —.020(2.5) —.018(1.8)
•a —.076(1.8) —.107(2.4) —.686(2.0) —.085(2.2) —.202(0.4) —.075(2.2) —.085(1.9)
14 1.106(1.7) .539(0.6) .967(1.8) .566(0.8) .291(0.4) —.739(1.0) —.805(0.7)
.037(1.4) .089(3.7) .124(2.9)
























R2 .749 .788 .857 .866 .860 .903 .921
n 60 60 60 60 60 60 4067
Table8
DeterminInt9 of (01.AProviiongkind Contrct Dur1on in Major
Colitcilvu b.irgi1nin Agruuro..nt81.5 Contract File
(abbolutu v.ilue t.HratistLca)
Dep.Vat. ZI Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9 Z10 Zll
E8t.Mth.Prob Pro Prob OLS OLS OLS OLS Prob Prub lob lob
lad. Vat.
Xl .011(1.5) —.001(0.2) —.000(0.1) .006(1.8) .002(1.1) —.001(0.3)—.000(0.0)—.203(4.1) .174(3.7) .009(0.6) .002(0.3)
12 —.053(0.9) .307(3.4) .273(2.6) —.071(2.0) .043(3.2) .112(2.2)—.012(1.4)—.026(0.2) .067(0.5) —.186(1.5) .008(0.2)
X3 .471(1.8)—1.240(3.4) —1.190(2.7) —.045(0.3)—.001(0.0)—.801(3.7) —.143(4.0)
-.392(0.8)—.430(0.9) .153(0.3) —.000(0.0)
14 —2.640(2.5) 3.028(1.9) 2.703(1.5) —1.630(2.7) —.301(1.2)2.266(2.4) .091(0.6)6.056(2.7) —5.070(2.3) —10.100(4.5) -3.060(4.4)
IS .181(0.7) .071(0.2) —.175(0.4) —.320(2.0)—027(0.5) .109(0.5) .157(4.4) 1.511(2.3) —1.330(2.1) 1.248(2.3) .212(1.3)
16 .005(0.6) —.012(0.8) —.005(0.3) .013(2.2) .005(2.3) .009(1.1) —.001(0.5)—.013(0.5)—.016(0.7) .028(1.5) .004(0.7)
17 —1.580(3.5) —.183(0.3) —.371(0.4) —.051(0.1) .055(0.4) —.233(0.5)—.144(2.3) —1.560(1.0) 1.472(1.0) —8.720(6.3) —2.320(6.1)
18 1.321(9.2) —.094(0.4) .242(0.9) —.076(0.7) —.041(1.0) .106(0.8) .091(4.4)—.196(0.5)—.037(0.1) 3.521(10.5) 1.118(10.5)
19 —.026(0.8) —.031(0.7) —.019(0.)) .036(2.2) .002(0.3)—.013(0.5) .004(0.8)—.142(2.4) .129(2.3)—.006(0.1)—.008(0.4)
110 2.998(1.6)—.243(0.1) —1.510(0.5) .301(0.3) .719(2.0)—.346(0.2) —.350(1.3) 1.236(0.3) —1.940(0.5) 6.118(1.7) 2.644(2.3)
Xli .007(0.2) —.184(2.3) —.216(2.2) .021(0.7)—.008(0.6) —.012(0.2) .003(0.8) —.099(1.0) .153(1.5) .153(1.8) .037(1.4)
112S.710(3.5).791(2.3)1.076(2.2).005(0.4).001(0.2).127(0.1).047(1.7).299(0.7)—.292(0.7)2.325(5.6) .685(5.6)
113a—.007(0.0)—1.181(1.8) —2.974(2.4) —.062(0.2) .168(2.0) —1.756(4.5) .018(1.2) .714(0.9) —1.109(1.4) .597(1.2) .178(1.3)
114 .507(0.5) 1.534(0.9)—.481(02) 1.128(1.4).230(0.7)—.107(0.1)—.165(1.1) —1.920(0.6)2.678(0.9)3.666(1.4)1.313(1.7)
115 .116(2.8) .021(0.3)—.008(0.1) .074(2.9)—.001(0.1)—.029(0.8) —.009(1.5)—.294(2.9) .242(2.4) .251(2.9) .077(2.9)
116 —.068(2.4) .040(0.9) .075(1.4)—.011(0.6).008(1.2).079(3.0)—.013(3.0)—.056(0.8) .036(0.5)—.251(4.1) —.072(3.7)
117 2.548(2.7)—.238(0.2)—.344(0.2) 1.051(1.7) .054(0.2) .052(0.1) .174(1.3) 1.138(0.5) —1.500(0.7) 5.315(2.5) 1.041(1.6)
118—2.620(3.1)—.593(0.5)—.648(0.4) —1.410(3.1) .009(0.5) .235(0.3) .351(2.9)3.784(2.3) —.3.620(2.2) —4.970(2.8) —1.110(2.0)
119—1.550(3.1) —2.110(2.7) —1.510(1.7) .445(1.3) .147(1.2) —1.090(2.3) —.217(3.1) —4.730(3.3) 4.006(3.1)—.525(0.5) .025(0.7)
1201.275(3.3)—.750(1.2)—.534(0.7).299(1.0).187(1.8)—.375(1.1).235(4.3).640(0.6)—.496(0.5)3.318(3.7) .949(3.5)
121—.120(1.0).511(3.0).343(1.7)—.091(1.4).013(0.5).106(1.1)—.007(0.4).506(2.3)—.506(2.3)—.259(1.0)—.082(1.1)
122 —.741(1.3) —2.210(2.7) —2.170(2.2) —2.170(2.2)—.247(0.8)—.330(2.6) —.748(1.6)—.174(1.2)2.503(1.8)—1.880(1.5) —2.200(1.9)
123—.206(1.1) .641(1.7) .404(0.9) .104(0.8)—.038(0.7) .424(1.9) .052(1.9)—.057(0.1)—.192(0.4) .377(0.9) .091(0.7)
'24 —.370(0.8) .531(0.8) 1.682(2.1)—.476(1.9) .186(L8) .320(0.8)—.263(3.8) .560(0.5) —1.060(1.0) —1.090(1.2) —.141(0.5)
125 .239(0.3).629(0.4) .016(0.0) 1.549(2.4) —.152(0.6) .472(0.5) .146(1.3)—.577(2.3)3.410(1.4) .839(0.4) .543(0.9)
&2 .366 .293 .287 ,174
ln(L)—510.18 —364.02 198.86 —152.17 —159.01 —922.56 —590.018
DY 1011 445 445 306 329 431 1009 290 290 832 85568
Table8 (continuod)
Dep.ndcnt Variables (5sampleincludes only contracts withCOLAs)
ZI 1 —contracthas COLA. 0 —noCOLA
Z2 frequency of COLAreviewafter first year: 1 —monthly, 2quarterly. 3 —semi—annual.4 —Annual
23* 1 —COLA reviewin first year, 0 —noreview
Z45 COLAformula—numbersof cents for each point increase in the CPI
Z5 COLAformula—estimatedpercentage point increase in wages for each percentage point increase in the CU
26* logarithm of months until first COLArevtew
27 logarithm of contract duration (in months)
Z85 I —minimumCOLA increase guaranteed, 0no minimum
29* 1maximum COLA increase or cap, 0 —nocap
210 COLA formula —numberof cents per each point increase in the CPI. 0 if no COLA




OLS Ordinary Least Squares -
TobitTobit
Explanatory Variables**
11 number of employees covered by the contract
12 industryquit rate
13 8firmconcentrationratio
14 wages as a share of shipments in the industry
X5 percentage of production workers unionized in the industry (3 digit)
X6 number of different unions representing workers in the Industry (2 digit)
X7 imports/total sales in the industry
18 1 *durablegoods industry, 0 —nondurable
19 mean rate of expected inflation —Livingstonsurvey forecasts —6monthforecastprior to date of contract
110 coefficient of variation of forecasters expected inflation rate
Xli estimateof a
11 from the within—industry regression
X12 estimate of a2 PPI P
, ( 1og() o+a,log() +at+ t An e.LSSLC onresloudi varLanlce wJ 1J--t.!CJ
114 average Ui net replacement rate in the industty —averageweekly UI benefits/average weekly net (after tax)
loss of income of laid—off workers





120 percentage residing in SMSA'. union members in the 3—digit census industry
121 meanschooling
122 percentage craftsmen
123 mean number of children
124 percentage residing in the aouth
125 .hare of total family income due to wages of union member
** Alsoincluded were dummyvariablesfor nonreporcing of import/salea ratio, producer price indices, and the
concent rat ion rate.
a Coefficienthas been divided by 100

















1. See H.M. Douty (1975) for a more complete discussion of the history
of cost—of—living clauses in union contracts in the United States.
2. We say rekindling since academic interest in the effect of indexa—
tion schemes, such as COLA's, on the economy goes back at least as far as
Alfred Marshall (1886).
3. See, for example, Daniel Mitchell (1980) and Marvin Kosters (1977).
4. On the growing insensitivity of the aggregate rate of wage inflation
to unemployment, see James Tobin (1980). On the insensitivity of deferred
wage increases, including COLA's, in union contracts to unemployment, see
Daniel Mitchell (1978).
5. For evidence on the "yield" from COLA's, see Victor Shiefer (1979).
We will return to this point below. Henry Farber (1981), Wallace Hendricks
and Lawrence Kahn (forthcoming), Lawrence Kahn (1981), and Wayne Vroman (1982)
have presented evidence on the role of COLA's in the inflationary process.
6. For details of this argument and aggregate evidence that the presence
of COLA's reduce strike activity, see Bruce Kaufman (1981). See also Martin
Nauro (1982) for a similar argument and empirical evidence using individual
contract negotiation data.
7. Important contributions here include Robert J. Barro (1977), Olivier
J. Blanchard (1979), Stanley Fisher (1977a; 1977b), and JoAnna Gray (1976;
1978).
8. The relevant papers here are Costas Azariadis (1978), Leif Danziger
(1980), and Steven Shavell (1976). Important initial contributions to the
"implicit contract" literature include Costas Azariadis (1975), Martin Baily
(1974), Donald Gordon (1974), and Hershel Grossman (1977).
9. See David Estenson (1981), Wallace }endricks and Lawrence Kahn
(forthcoming), Lawrence Kahn (1981), and David Card (1981; 1982). The former
three studies are primarily empirical in nature; they do not provide rigorous
analytical models that permit them to identify all of the forces
that influence COLA's. Our paper is more in the tradition of Card's work,
although in some respects (which we note below) our model is more general
than his, and his empirical analyses use Canadian contract data.
10. There are, of course, exceptions to this statement. The "ton tax"
method of financing fringe benefits that prevailed for many years in the
bituminous coal industry is an example of a contract where compensation is
contingent upon productivity; as is well known, this scheme was designed to
reduce employers' incentives to substitute capital for labor. Similarly,
the recent UAW contract with Chrysler and the airline contracts with Eastern
Airlines, that tie compensation to profits, implicItly are contingent on all
uncertain events.* 71
11. For more on this point, see the discussion between Robert Barro
(1977) and Stanley Fisher (1977—a).
12. The key role of unanticipated inflation in the indexation decision
has been previously noted by David Card (1981). Richard Parks (1978) showed
that relative prices are affected by unanticipated inflation, but not by
perfectly anticipated inflation.
13. See Jan Svejnar (1982) forrn an attempt to accomplish this objective.
14. Indexation to other variables is discused below.
15. The elasticity of MEl'w.r.t.x is i, where from (11)
=
16.Hendricks and Kahn (1982) erroneously concluded that increased
employee risk aversion always would lead to increased wage indexation.
17. Although p and do not influence c directly, it is conceiv-
able that they influence the bargaining over the total pie available and thus
affect c through this route (see equation (12) and Martin Feldstein (1980)
and Eytan Sheshinski and Yoram Weiss (1977) on this point).
18. Note further that if A is also less than zero, so that indexation
is less than complete, this implies that increased residual uncertainty reduces
the extent of indexation. This apparently is a hypothesis that Estenson (1981)
and Hendricks and Kahn (1982) sought to test, although they did not distinguish
between anticipated and unanticipated aggregate inflation.
19. In determining the monetary value of indexation, we assume that w
and hence also r are the same for indexed and non—indexed contracts. As
our discussion about c should indicate, this may not be an innocuous
assumption and it should be viewed as a further approximation.
20. This assumes that 0 < e < 2. Differentiating B partially w.r.t.
S and using equation (12) yields
=- W•c[23c/3S(S—wN EV"/EV') +ci
+ 4 c[2(1—c)+ ci= - 2c(2—c)> 0 if 0 < c < 2.
21. The effect of these costs on the degree of indexation, if it occurs,
is ambiguous and depends, among other things, on the distribution of the
costs between the workers and the firm.




B=-- wN+(1+A)S(1 + WNE1T /Eir).
Sincethe term in the parentheses increases with it follows that
> 0 as long as c .0.
V72
23. The demand and input prices may depend also on unanticipated
inflation in periods before period 1. However, since there is no uncertainty
about the unanticipated inflation in periods before period 1, this dependenc\'
needs not be made explicit.
24. The formula is more complex for p1p.
-A
25. The reason that D is proportionate to p is that although
only the unanticipated change in th aggregate price level 1D2 has real
effects, the wage gets indexed to the total change in the aggregate price
level(ii). To avoid the expected change in th aggregate price level
having real effects y must therefore be proportional to p for all p2.
SiRce
= ande2 =1+A,this is obtained by multiplying tby
in D.Consequently, assuming that p >1,the effects of a, b,
r, and on D are the opposite of their effects on
26. Perfect sharing of risks requires only that w2 and have
the same elasticity with respect to and hence that £2 =1+A. Thus,
there is no inefficiency in the sharing of —risks.
27. If a equals zero, and £2 <1one similarly can show that one
requires that <1to get the same result.
28. For example, Douty (1975) reports that in 1975 3.2 percent of all
contracts with a duration of one year, 14.8 percent of all contracts with a
duration of two years, and 50.0 percent of all contracts with a duration of
three years contained a COLA (these figures refer to major collective
bargaining agreements only).
Note that it may also be reasonable to assume that the effect of within—
period unanticipated inflation on demand and input prices is closer to zero
in the second period than in the first. If this is the case, it provides
another reason for the degree of indexation being closer to complete in long—
term contracts.
29. Martin Feldstein (1976) has stressed the effect of UI system
parameters on temporary layoffs, but he does so in the context of a model in
which both workers and firms are risk neutral so that the degree of indexation
is indeterminate. See also Martin Baily (1977).
30. See Frank Brechling (1982) for a more detailed parameterization of
the financing of the UI system.
31. In general, a change in UI system parameters may lead to changes in
both the wage schedule w(p) and the employment schedule L(p). Without
developing an explicit bargaining model or holding some variables constant,
one cannot obtain implications about how a parameter change af.fects either
schedule if both are allowed to freely vary. In what follows in this section
then, we always must specify carefully what we are holding constant. When
we look at parameter changes on employment, we will hold the whole wage
schedule constant. When we look at parameter changes on the extent of indexa—
tion (below), we will hold the "full—employment" employment level and the
wage rate associated with some arbitrary price level constant.73
32. One could, of course, allow for utility from leisure by specifying
that Z(X) =U(X)+inwhere inisthe utility the worker receives from
leisure time (not working). This obviously satisfies the condition in the
text.
33. This conclusion, and the one that follows, ignores that fact that
whether L will also depend upon the parameters of the UI system.
For example, an increase in the price level decreases the real valueof UI
benefits; this makes layoffs more attractive to the firm, and lessattractive
to workers and,without full knowledge of the bargaining process, wecannot
unambiguously ascertain how this will affect the layoff rateassociated with
each price level. We assume in what follows that. this effect is smalland
that the relationship between and p1 can be inferred solely from the
sign of A.
34. As noted earlier, major collective bargaining agreements are
those that cover 1,000 or more workers.
35. Simpler autoregressive structures yielded virtually identical
results.
a ar a tu.
36. Suppose that (S/P) =a0r!0Pt_Et_i)]
1 2ee
it
wherea1 representsthe effect of unanticipated inflation on demand, a2
the serial correlation in the effects of unanticipated inflation and a3 the
expected growth in demand. Taking logs of the equation, lagging it one
period and multiplying the lagged equation by a2 and then subtractingthis
from the unlagged equation, the result in the text immediately follows.
We should caution here that these parameters may actually represent
parameters of the real value added function, not parametersof the demand
curve. However, since the implications that resultwould essentially be
the same, for expository convenience we continue in the text torefer to them
as parameters of the demand function. An analogous problemarises with
respect to the parameters of equation (62) below.
37. See Wayne Vroman (1980) for a description of the modeland data.
We are grateful to him for generously providing us with thesedata.
38. As Section III suggests, however, there are situations inwhich
Increased residual uncertainty would increase the probability of observing
an indexed contract, which is not the empirical result weobserve.
39. Some studies, however, find that relative risk aversionexceeds
unity. See, for example, Henry Farber (1978) and IrwinFriend and Marshall
Blume (1975).
40. For example, in 1981 45 percent of all major collective bargain-
ing agreements with OJLA's called for quarterly reviews, 21 percent called
for semi—annual reviews, and 30 percent had annual reviews (see Douglas
LeRoy (1981)).
41. See AFL—CIO (1979).74
42. COLA's may also be excluded from wages for the purpose of
computing.certain nonwage benefits in some cases (e.g., vacation pay)and
somecontracts also permit COLA adjustments to be deferred to pay for
nonwage benefits (e.g., COLA being used to finance improvedbenefits for
retirees rather than increased pay for existing employees).
43. Our discussion of these two approaches should make it clear why
we consider it equally inappropriate to use the expected COLA increase,
valued at the expected level of inflation over the contract, as a measure
of the generosity of a COLA. This measure, which Hendricks and Kahn inform
us they plan to use in future work, tells us little aboutthe response of
wages to unanticipated inflation.
44. This test may be excessively stringent. To see this note that
more generous COLA provisions are, ceteris paribus, those with frequent
reviews, reviews in the first year, large wage increases for given CPI
increases, a short number of months until the first review, minimum
guaranteed COLA increases, and no maximum permissable increase (cap).If
a variable, in theory, should increase generosity, we testif it has
influenced each of the above in a way that increases, or does not affect,
the COLA. A weaker test would allow some of the provisions to move in
"opposite directions" as long as the net effect is to make the COLA more
generous. This would require us, however, toreduce the COLA formula to a
single number and, as we have argued in the text, we do notbelieve that
this is a wise strategy.
45. We are grateful to John Carlson of Purdue for providing the
unpublished data for the most recent years to us.
46. The Livingston Series could not be used here since the underlying
survey is conducted every six months and we required quarterlyexpectations.
47. Producer price indices for many of the industries were not
collected prior to 1973. 1978 was chosen as the end date because mostof
the contracts in the sample commenced at that date or later.
48. Of course, since only 1 of 11 UI coefficients is statistically
significant, and that at less than the .05 level, this mayreflect only a
spurious correlation.
49. In any case, we did not receive the micro data in a form that
would allow us to use the approaches of either Hendricks and Kahn (1982)
or Card (1981).75
APPENDIX A
The first order condition for maximization of is
(Al)d= — EV'=0 <=>U'=XNEV'
dwppe e
Eq. (Al) is the condition for efficient sharing of inflation risks, and it
implies that the workers and the firm have identical marginal rates of
substitution between different realization of p. Differentiating eq. (Al)
totally w.r.t. p,
d(w/p)= —Nd(w/p)+!
dp e L dpXPdPJ
Multiplying by p and noting that the last term in the brackets vanishes







Eq. (8) implies that
(A3) (q+fi)--h
which together with eq. (7) becomes
(A4) gf =
p(l—p8)76





which shows that A is the elasticity of real value—added w.r.t. p.




SEV'— EV" e pe
To derive results about how c is related to the extent of residual
uncertainty, we make the following assumptions:







S+RwNEir /Eir e e









Err —Rf (it—if —R(R+1)rt (ri—if)
..—R—1 —R—1 +
1 2
Eu E e e
+(R+1)(R+2)(if+wN)22 =
+
whichincreases in 4.Theresult in the text follows.
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APPENDIX B
The real amount I a worker is willing to pay in order to have his
wage indexed is defined by
w
EU(—) =1J(E I),. p p pP
where w is the constant wage if there is no wage indexation, and w, as
previously defined, is the wage with wage indexation. An approximate value
for I is given by
V
+1, pp p p 1 2
where I and 12 are the risk premium a worker is willing to pay in order
to obtain a certain real wage instead of w/p and vip, respectively.
That is,
V
(B1 EU( =U(E—— I). p'p' 'p p 1
(B2) EU(—) =U(E!—
ApproximateU(w/p) by the first three terms of a Taylor series
expansion around p =79
EU(S)E(U(w) + U'()
d(w/p)
p p p dp
+ -]2+ U'(w)d2(w/p)
dp dp2
(B3) =U()+ [U"(2(c-1)2 + U'(2d2(w/p)
dp2
where c is evaluated at p =p.
Approximate U(E—I)bythe first two terms of a Taylor series pp 1
expansion around EwIp —I
=w,and then w/p by the first three terms
of a Taylor series expansion around p =
U(E—I)U() + — —
pp 1 pp




(B4) =U()+ U'()[d2(w/p)1 -22 -
dp
In view of eq. (Bi) one therefore obtairth from eqs. (B3) and (B4)
- U'2(e-1)22
>I
where S is evaluated at w/p =80
Since the unindexed wage is constant, a similar derivation based on




IE-E--+Sw pp pp 2p
Similarly, the real amount J the firm is willing to pay inorder to




where is the profit if there is no indexation, and ,aspreviously
defined, is the profit with indexation. An approximate valuefor J is
given by
iT JE !_E——+j
p,epp,e p 1 2
where and are the risk premiums the firm is willing to pay in
order to eliminate inflation uncertainty with indexed andunindexed wages,
respectively. That is,81
(B5) E V() =EV(E—
J1) p,e pe pp
iT iT
(B6) E V(—) =EV(E—s)— J)
p,epe pp 2
Approximating V(it/p) by the first three termsof a Taylor series
expansion around p =
d(rrfp (p—)
E V(!i) E (V(ir) + V'(ff)






where c is evaluated at p =p.
Approximating V(EiT/p —J1)
by the first two terms of a Taylor series
expansion around Err/p —= ,andthen it/p by the first three terms of
a Taylor series expansIon around p =
EV(E!— j EV(,t) + E[V'(rr)(E—J—it)]
epp 1 e e pp 1










Together with eq. (B5), eqs. (B7) and (B8) yield
-
J1EV' E(V"[( +WN)A -N(c-1)]2}2
— CV[G + WN)A —wN(c—1)]2)/EV';
where Vt and V" are evaluated atri. A similar derivation based on
eq. (B6) leads to





CVtt[(ir + N)A +
Note thatE ri/p + NE w/p =Eit/p+ E w /p; thus the total real amount
p,e p p,en p n







which, by use of (12) in the text, maybewritten as
wN —wNEV"/EVt).APPENDIX C
Normalizing the utility functions such that U'(l) =V'(l)=1,
the first order condition for maximization of are
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Substituting
- 1+A
y =Dp and it1and












Multiplying (Cl) by w and taking the expectation over
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Since e1 and e2 are identically distributed,













Name Variable Description Source
vi 3—year average of the quit U.S.. Bur.eau of Labor Statistics
rate (BLS), Employment and Earnings,
Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1979.
v2 number of unions in the
ipdustry U.S. BLS, Drectory of National
Unions and Employee Associations,
1979, Washington, D.C., Gov't.
• Printing Office, 1980, Bulletin
No. 1750.
v3 percentage of unionized
workers in the industry
v4 3—year average of the profit U.S. Federal Trade Commission,
rate Quarterly Financial Report for
Manufacturing Corporations, 1972—
1977, Washington, D.C.: GPO.
v5 percentage of workers coveredU.S. BLS, Characteristics of Major
by multiemployer agreements Collective Bargaining Agreernencs,
in the industry January 1, 1978, Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1980, Bulletin No. 2065.
v6 percentage of income due to
wage earnings of the union
member
v7 mean age of union members
v8 percentage of union members
who are married Authors' calculations from the
May 1978 Current Population
v9 percentage of union members Survey data file.
who are .white
vlO percentage of union members
who are male
vii percentage of union members
residing in SMSA'sVariable
Name Variable Description
v12 mean schooling level of union
members
v13 mean number of children in
married union memberst
families
quarterly data on consumer
price index
average UI net replacement
rate =averageweekly UI
benefit/average weekly net
(after tax) loss of income
by laid—off unemployed
workers in the industry





Z3 1=COLA review in first year,
O=no review
Z4 COLA formula —numberof cents




centage point increase in the
wages, for each percentage
point increase in the CPI.
logarithm of months until
first COLA review
Source
Authors' calculations from the
May 1978 Current Population
Survey data file.
U.S. BLS, Monthly Labor Review,
1972—1977, Washington, D.C.: GPO.
Authors' calculations from the
Urban Institute's unemployment
insurance microsimulation data
file. See Wayne Vroman, "A
Simulation Model of Unemployment
Insurance," National Commission
on Unemployment Compensation,
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980,
Compendium, for further details.
U.S. BLS, Monthly Labor Review,
Washirigton, D.C.: GPO, January
(1975, 1978 and 1981. Bulletin
J
No.1868.
U.S. BLS, Employment and Earnings,
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981.
Unpublished data from BLS file






fraction of workers covered
by a COLA
fraction of contracts with
COLA provisions







Name Variable Description Source
87
Z7 logarithm of contract dura-
tion (in months)
Z8 1=minimum COLA increase
guarantee, O=no minimum
Z9 1=maximum COLA increase or
cap, O=no cap
Z1O COLA formula —numberof
cents per each point
increase in the CPI, 0=
no COLA
COLA formula —estimatedper-
centage point increase in
wages for each percentage
point increase in the CPI,
O=no COLA
Xl number of employees covered
by the contract
X2 industry quit rate
X5 percentage of production
workers unionized in the
industry (3 digit)
X6 number of different unions
representing workers in the
industry
X7 import/total sales in the
industry
Unpublislted data from BLS file




U.S. BLS, Employment and Earnings,
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981.
U.S. BLS, Concentration Ratios in
Manufacturing, 1972, Washington,
D.C.: GPO.
TIClIT C' 1 U •• tLLLLLVey Ui. LtLU
facturers,1977, Washington, D.C.:
GPO.
Freeman, R.B. and J.L. Medoff,
"New Estimates of Private Sector
Unionism in the United States,"
Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, January 1979.
U.S. BLS, Directory of National
Unions and Employee Associations,
1979, Washington, D.C.: GPO,
Bulletin No. 1750.
Import data from U.S. Important
SIC—Based Products, U.S. Dept. of
Commerce publication FT 210, 1977).
Total sales data from 1977 Census
of Manufacturing Industries, U.S.
BLS, Washington, D.C.: GPO.
zll
X3 8—firm concentration ratio
TI. C a C J1. L1.i.pLLLeLLL
inthe industry88
Variable
Name Variable Description Source
X9 mean rate of expected infla— Livingston survey data as pub—
tion 6 months prior to date lished in John Carlson, "A
of contract Study of Price Forecasts,"
Annals of Economic and Social
X1O coefficient of variation of Measurement, March 1977 (private
forecasters expected infla— correspondence from Carlson for
tion rate later years).
X14 average UI net replacement See .UI variable source in
rate in the industry Section VII.





X20 percentage residing in SMSA'sAuthor's calculations from the
May 1978 Current Population
X21 mean schooling Survey data file.
X22 percentage craftsmen
X23 mean number of children
X24 percentage residing in the
south
X25 share of total family income
due to wages of union member
quarterly data on consumer
price index US. BLS, Monthly Labor Review,
j1972—1977,Washington, D.C.:
quarterly data on producer jGPO.
price index )89
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